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ABSTRACT  
 
A LEGAL APPROACH TO THE GREEK TURKISH CONTINENTAL SHELF 
DISPUTE AT THE AEGEAN SEA 
 
Toppare, Nevin Aslı 
 
MIR, Department of International Relations  
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Yüksel Đnan  
 
March 2006 
 
This master’s thesis aims to analyze, in detail, the issue of the delimitation of the 
continental shelf areas in the Aegean Sea, which can be accepted as one of the most 
challenging disputes between Greece and Turkey. This research, while analyzing the 
nature of the dispute, the approaches of Greek and Turkish governments respectively 
and the applicable international legal rules, also aims to provide a permanent settlement 
proposal that would be fair and equitable to both sides.  
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ÖZET  
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Bu yüksek lisans tez çalışması Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasındakı en zorlu 
anlaşmazlıklardan biri olan, Ege Denizi’nde kıta sahanlığının iki ülke arasında 
sınırlandırılmasını ele almaktadır. Bu çalışma, anlaşmazlığın içeriğini, Türk ve Yunan 
hükümetlerinin konuya yaklaşımlarını ve uygulanabilecek uluslararası hukuk kurallarını 
ortaya koymakla beraber, her iki taraf için de adil ve hakkaniyete dayalı kalıcı bir çözüm 
önerisi sunmayı da amaçlamaktadır.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Greece and Turkey, the two neighboring states of the Aegean Sea, share a history of 
cooperation as well as conflictual relations.   From the mid-1950s up until today, the two 
states have fallen into several disagreements, some of which turned out to be major 
crises that brought them to the brink of war. The main source of conflict between the 
governments of Greece and Turkey tends to stem either from Cyprus or the Aegean Sea. 
These issues not only remain to be unsolved, but also result in the continuous unstable 
and tense atmosphere in the region.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to deal with one of the central disputes over the waters of 
the Aegean: the issue of delimiting the continental shelf areas in the Aegean Sea 
between Greece and Turkey. The continental shelf issue should neither be considered as 
a simple maritime delimitation issue, nor should it be taken as a mere political issue 
between states striving for more territorial gains. Above all, with its unique 
configuration, the Aegean Sea constitutes a special maritime area that deserves a special 
study. No where in the whole world a similar sea exists, where many relevant factors 
needs to be taken into account for a just delimitation.  
 
The unstable and conflictual relationship of Greece and Turkey over the Aegean is not 
only a matter of bilateral political relations between the two, but is also an economic 
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one. What is striking about the issue is that, the current deadlock over the delimitation of 
the continental shelf areas deprives both states from making use of possible economic 
resources. This is because; only a permanent solution to the problem will allow both 
states to benefit from the natural resources from the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea. 
In 1976, Turkey had offered Greece the joint exploitation of the natural resources 
underneath the Aegean, however this had been rejected by Greece. Thus, these resources 
could not be used since the Bern Agreement of 1976 where Greece and Turkey agreed 
not to explore and exploit the reserves under the sea, which resulted in a significant 
economic loss.   
 
Moreover, when looked from another perspective, the continental shelf issue between 
Greece and Turkey is as much important for European politics. After the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union and along with the new political map of Europe, European Union 
(EU) has obliged its member and candidate states to resolve their territorial and 
sovereignty issues as a fundamental and indispensable condition for a conflict-free 
European geography. This policy was reflected in the 1997 EU Summit in Luxembourg, 
in which it was asked for the resolution of the Greek-Turkish disputes. As a candidate 
state, this put a harsh obligation on the shoulders of Turkey to show effort on smoothing 
the relations with her neighbor and to seek for a solution.  
 
 
In this regard, it is quite crucial to find out a solution for the dispute as early as possible. 
Affecting them politically and economically, both states are obliged to come up with an 
answer to the problem between them over the Aegean Sea. This study aims to suggest a 
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possible solution to the dispute that will be acceptable and just for both sides. 
Consequently, it outlines the sources of the dispute within its historical context, analyzes 
the approach of the two governments to the problem and reveals the applicable 
international legal rules to the dispute. The thesis provides a resolution for the settlement 
of the dispute so long as both sides are willing to solve the issue in the light of 
international law.  
 
In this context, initially, the history of Greek-Turkish relations is studied in order to have 
a better grasp of the nature of the relationship of the two Aegean states and to 
understand why these issues had not been solved in the previous decades. The first 
Chapter, handling the historical background of the relations of Greece and Turkey, thus 
includes the era before World War I, the foundation of the new Turkish State that 
entailed years of cooperation and the western alliance that connected the two to each 
other. This period is followed by conflictual relationships, starting with the Cyprus 
problem and continued with the continental shelf issue; harassments to one another in 
the Aegean.  
 
To give an insight to the continental shelf dispute, the following chapter focuses on the 
characteristics of the Aegean Sea that bears in itself tricky problems because of its 
extraordinary configuration that necessitates special solutions. This is followed by the 
legal concept of the continental shelf; how it evolved and how it was perceived by states. 
The fourth Chapter analyzes in detail the chronology of incidents that occurred under the 
heading of the continental shelf dispute in the Aegean Sea. It starts by focusing on the 
roots of the conflict and reciprocal reactions to one another, continued by a summary of 
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the negotiations held in 1970s and 1980s in order to settle the problem. Individual and 
bilateral attempts to bring a solution to the issue are covered in this chapter with 
reference to official documents and correspondence between the two states.  
 
The fifth Chapter concentrates on the legal justifications that are put forward by Greece 
and Turkey respectively, to display their own solutions to the problem. As the two sides 
can not reach an agreement on the area of the dispute, the way to settle the dispute or 
laws applicable for a settlement, the next chapter presents what the international law of 
the sea offers in respect of the Aegean Case. This chapter takes into account the special 
character of the Aegean Sea and accordingly outlines the international legal rules 
applicable. It also makes reference to previous relevant judgments of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) as a source of international law. An overall evaluation is provided 
in the concluding part, paving the way to a solid and more importantly permanent 
solution to the stormy situation in the Aegean.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GREEK-TURKISH 
RELATIONS 
 
Greek-Turkish relations concerning the Aegean Sea is not separable from other issues 
between the two neighboring states, as every political issue had its effect over the 
Aegean disputes in the history of Greece and Turkey. The cooperative relationship 
within the first half of the 20th century had a positive reflection on the waters of Aegean; 
whereas continuous conflict during the second half of the century paved the way for 
endless conflicts, resulting in a deadlock in the Aegean Sea.  
 
 
1.1 Greeks and Turks before World War I 
 
In line with traditional Greek foreign policy, the Greek-Turkish relations are often 
shaped by the Megali Idea1. Although there is no specific definition for the concept of 
                                                 
1
 “Megali Idea” means Great Idea in English. The term was invented by Ioannis Kolettis, who was 
appointed Prime Minister in 1844 in Greece. Then, politics of personality being popular in Greece, 
Kolettis constantly referred to this concept that Greeks must be reunited by annexing Ottoman territories 
adjacent to the republic. For further details on the evolution and the development of Megali Idea, see 
Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 47-99. 
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Megali Idea, it refers to the establishment of a greater Greece, the Great Greek Empire 
or a Hellenic Cultural Empire2. Since Greece had gained its independence from the 
Ottoman Empire in 1821, it constantly strived for more territorial gains at the expense of 
the Ottoman territories. The Greek ambitions included the Western Anatolia as well as 
the whole Aegean Sea and the islands, not to exclude Cyprus.  
 
The Ottoman Empire on the other hand was struggling for survival during the same 
period of time. It lost considerable territory in the 19th century. In the beginning of the 
20th century, World War I brought Greece and the Ottoman Empire against each other, 
due to British promise of the Western Anatolia to Greeks and the thought that the 
German power would help Turks regain their lost territories. The World War I was 
followed by the Turkish War of Independence in Anatolia, where Greeks and Turks 
fought in the eastern coast of the Aegean Sea3.  
 
 
1.2 Peace Treaty and a New Era 
 
After the Greek-Turkish war ended in 1922, the Lausanne Treaty was signed in July 24, 
1923, which set the foundations of the new Turkish state as well as solving the territorial 
and minority issues with Greece. Following many years of war, the Lausanne Treaty 
ensured peaceful relations between the two states in the coming years. The treaty is a 
                                                 
2
 Suat Bilge. Büyük Düş, Türk Yunan Siyasi Đlişkileri, (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl, 2000), p. 13. 
3
 For further details on the Greek-Turkish War of 1919-1922, see Mustafa Turan. Yunan Mezalimi; Izmir, 
Aydin, Manisa, Denizli 1919-1923, (Ankara: AKDYTK, 1999); Salahi R. Sonyel. The Turco-Greek 
Imbroglio, Pan-Hellenism and the Destruction of Anatolia, (Ankara : Ministry of Foreign Affairs Center 
for Strategic Research, 1999). 
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significant stepping stone in Greek-Turkish relations as well as a fundamental document 
that today’s relations of the two states rely on.  
 
The main issues that were settled between Greece and Turkey with the peace treaty were 
the territorial boundary in the Thrace, the sovereignty over the Aegean islands and their 
status, and finally the population exchange. The land border between Greece and Turkey 
was defined as the Meriç (Maritza) River, separating the Eastern and Western Thrace, 
where the formal boundary line would pass as the “thalveg” went along, the center route 
of the river4.  As for the maritime boundaries, other than the islands of Bozcaada 
(Imbros), Gökçeada (Tenados) and Tavşan (Rabbit) Islands, which guarded the entrance 
to the straits, particularly the islands of Limni (Limnos), Semendirek (Samothrace), 
Midilli (Lesvos), Sakız (Chios), Sisam (Samoz) and Nikaria (Ikaria) are confirmed to be 
under Greek sovereignty. In Article 6 of the Treaty, it was stated that, “…islands and 
islets lying within 3 nautical miles of the coast are included within the frontier of the 
coastal state”. It was provided in Article 12 that “except where a provision to the 
contrary is contained in the present treaty, the islands situated at less than three miles 
from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish sovereignty”5.  
 
In relation to these decisions, with a view to ensure the maintenance of peace, the Greek 
Government had to undertake several military restrictions in the islands of Midilli 
(Lesvos), Sakız (Chios), Sisam (Samoz) and Nikaria (Ikaria). There would be no naval 
                                                 
4Lausanne Treaty, Part I, Article 2. See Cemil Bilsel, Lozan, (Đstanbul: Soysal, 1998), pp. 17-19. For the 
realted provisions of the Lausanne Treaty, see Appendix A. 
5
 In view of these provisions, the Lausanne Treaty implicitly recognized the status of 3 nautical miles 
territorial sea of Greece and Turkey prevailing at that time.  
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bases and no fortifications, the Greek military aircrafts will be forbidden to fly over the 
territory of the Anatolian coast and the Greek military forces in the said islands will be 
limited to the normal contingent called up for military service6.  
 
One other significant issue that was held in Lausanne was the minority problem between 
the two states. The matter was dealt in a separate protocol signed on January 30, 1923 
that decided on a compulsory population exchange. “The Convention Concerning the 
Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations” provided for the exchange of Greeks of 
Anatolia and the Turks of Greece, with two exceptions – the Greeks of Đstanbul and the 
Turks of Western Thrace. In total, the Greeks who left Turkey amounted to 1.000.000 
and about 400.000 came to Turkey from Greece7. Although the population removal of 
this mass was a problematic and a painful process for the two communities, the 
exchange actually aimed to remove a possible friction in the future, by helping create 
more homogenous nations.  
 
Right after the Lausanne Treaty was signed, numerous problems arose on the population 
exchange constituting a continuous and obstructing matter, which hindered the relations 
between the two states approximately a decade. From the first years, the Greek 
government confiscated the possessions of the Muslim Turks in the Western Thrace, 
with the rational of the area being the first place to reside for the Greeks coming from 
Turkey. Moreover, although it was not comparable to the Greek practice in the Western 
                                                 
6
 Lausanne Treaty, Part I, Article 13. See Suat Bilge, Büyük Düş, Türk Yunan Siyasi Đlişkileri, (Ankara: 21. 
Yüzyıl, 2000), pp. 123-125; Şükrü S. Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut Đçerisinde Türk Yunan Đlişkileri, (1821-1993) 
(Ankara: Ümit Yayınclılık, 1993), pp. 30-34. 
7
 Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955, (Boulder: Westview, 1990), pp.11-12; Murat 
Hatipoğlu,  Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923-1954, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), pp. 45-58. 
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Thrace, Turkish government taking the Greek possessions in Đstanbul disturbed the 
Greek government in the same manner8. Also, the nature of the exchange inherently had 
difficulties about who were the people to be transferred and problems in fact continued 
even after bilateral talks to overcome the vicissitudes. With Eleftherios Venizelos 
getting into power in 1928 in Greece, the issue was gradually overcome, and on June 10, 
1930 the “Ankara Accord” was signed. The agreement settled all remaining disputes 
arising from the transfer of populations and the value of properties left behind, paving 
the way to peaceful relations for the coming decades9.  
 
1.3 Years of Cooperation 
 
Greece and Turkey have shown great sense of cooperation starting in 1930. Just as 
Turkey needed peace and tranquility in its foreign relations to ensure internal 
development, so did Greece in order to provide stability and order within its boundaries. 
The two states were willing to secure the status quo and develop better relations with 
each other, resulting in Greek and Turkish leaders paying visits to their Aegean 
neighbors. On October 30, 1930 Greece and Turkey signed the “Treaty of Neutrality, 
Conciliation and Arbitration” as well as a protocol providing for parity of naval 
armaments and a commercial convention. The first two articles of the treaty ensured 
neutrality in its broadest sense in times of conflict. The following ones mainly focused 
on how the possible disputes between the two would be settled, calling for procedures of 
                                                 
8
 Murat Hatipoğlu. (1996), pp. 56-58.  
9Baskın Oran. Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular,Belgeler, Yorumlar, (Istanbul: 
Iletişim, 2001), pp.342-346. For further information and details of the settlement of the problems that 
arose from the population exchange see Đsmet Đnönü, Hatıralar, (Ankara: Bilgi, 1985). 
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conciliation if the dispute could not be settled by diplomatic means. As for naval forces, 
the parties were obliged by the Protocol not to build or purchase new warships without 
informing each other six months beforehand10.   
 
Following the Neutrality Treaty several agreements were reached between Greece and 
Turkey together with visits at prime ministerial level.  Most importantly, on September 
14, 1933 “Pact d’Entente Cordial” (The Pact of Cordial Friendship) was signed, the 5-
article-long pact guaranteeing the inviolability of their borders and committing them to 
consult each other on matters of common interest on international problems. In addition, 
the pact envisaged the sole representation of Greece and Turkey in relevant international 
conferences11. During his visit to Athens in November the same year, Turkish Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, declared that Greece and Turkey have almost 
become one country with the signing of this pact12. The rapprochement was taken one 
step further with the Balkan Pact, which was concluded in March 1934, between Greece, 
Turkey, Yugoslavia and Romania. The terms of the pact obliged the parties to guarantee 
                                                 
10
 The Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration provided for a general system of procedures for 
the pacific settlement of disputes between Greece and Turkey; the applicability of the terms of the treaty 
was discussed during the International Court of Justice settlement related to the Aegean Continental Shelf 
Case in paragraphs 91-93. Article 3 of the Treaty follows: “The high contracting parties commit 
themselves to submit to the conciliation procedures that were envisaged in Articles 8-19 hereinafter, if 
problems that divide them can not be solved through ordinary diplomatic means. In case conciliation 
procedures fail, a judicial decision will be sought, in compliance with Articles 20-23 of the present treaty. 
If the parties do not agree to apply to an arbitral tribunal in accordance with Article 55 and succeeding 
articles of the International Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 18 October 1907 or any 
other agreement that exists between them.” The whole text of the Treaty can be found in Hulusi Kılıç, 
Bilateral Agreements, Essential Documents and Declarations between Turkey and Greece since the 
Proclamation of the Turkish Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Deputy 
Directorate General for Maritime and Aviation Affairs, (Ankara: 2000), pp. 55-62 and in Appendix B. 
11
 Suat Bilge. (2000), p. 169. The whole text of The Pact of Cordial Friendship can be found in Hulusi 
Kiliç. (2000), pp. 83-84 and in Appendix C.  
12
 Alexis Alexandris. “Turkish Policy towards Greece during the Second World War and Its Impact on 
Greek-Turkish Détente”, Balkan Studies, Vol. 23 No. 1 (1982) cited in Tozun Bahcheli. (1990), p. 14. 
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the frontiers in the event of aggression against any of them, and to consult with one 
another in the event of any threat to peace in the region13.  
 
1.4 Over the Waters of the Aegean 
 
Meanwhile in the Aegean Sea, Greece had passed some decrees regarding its 
sovereignty over the waters of the Aegean. The Royal Decree of 6/18 September 1931 
defined the limit of its territorial waters to be 10 nautical miles for the purposes of 
aviation and control above the sea14. This act in fact did not specify the extent of the 
territorial sea but merely stated that the state exercises complete and absolute 
sovereignty over the airspace above its territory, which included the territorial sea as 
well.  
 
Concerning the territorial sea, the Greek Law No. 235 of 17 September 1936 fixed the 
extent of the territorial sea at 6 nautical miles from the coast15. However, it also included 
an exception to this 6 nautical mile limit by specifying that “it is without prejudice to 
provisions in force concerning special matters16, with respect to which the territorial 
zone shall be delimited at a distance either larger or smaller than six nautical miles”. In 
light of these developments Turkey did not intend to exercise such a policy or show a 
                                                 
13
 The Balkan Pact was genuinely intended to involve Bulgaria too, in order to prevent Bulgaria’s 
territorial claims against Greece and Turkey, and also hoped to discourage anticipated pressures from 
Germany or Italy to penetrate and control the Balkans. For details see William Hale. Turkish Foreign 
Policy (1774-2000, (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 61-62. 
14
 Greek Official Gazette 1931, No. 325, p.2589 cited in Deniz Bölükbaşı.  Turkey and Greece The 
Aegean Disputes, A Unique Case in International Law, (London: Cavendish, 2004), pp. 126-127.  
15
 Greek Official Gazette 1936, No. 325, p.2387 cited in Deniz Bölükbaşı. (2004), p. 127. 
16
 The “special matters” mentioned in this statement refers to the 10 nautical mile air space that the Greek 
Government had declared in September 1931. Greece wanted to ensure that new laws on the width of the 
territorial sea would not affect the width of the air space above.  
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reaction to the Greek legislation in the Aegean Sea at the time. On the issue of territorial 
waters, the Turkish government did not take any action for the next 30 years until the 
Turkish government promulgated Law no. 476 of 15 May 1964 on “Territorial Waters of 
the State”. It established 6 nautical miles territorial sea, however, also stipulated that, in 
the case of states claiming territorial sea beyond 6 nautical miles, Turkey would define 
its width of the territorial sea on the basis of reciprocity17.   
 
 
1.5 World War II and the Western Alliance 
 
During World War II, although Greece resented the fact that Turkey remained neutral 
instead of coming to Greece’s aid under the terms of the Balkan Pact, several acts of 
Turkish friendship and support ensured the continuation of the peaceful relations. 
Volunteers were organized among the ethnic Greek community in Đstanbul, food was 
sent across the Aegean to deal with starvation in Greece and Allied aids were allowed to 
pass through Turkish territory as well as permitting the escapees from Greece18. In 
addition, Turkey did not show a negative attitude when the Dodecanese were given to 
Greece in 194719.  
                                                 
17
 Law no. 476 of 15 May 1964. As a result of this application of the reciprocity principle, the extent of the 
territorial sea in the Black Sea was extended to 12 nautical miles as a response to 12 nautical mile-limit 
claims of USSR, Romania and Bulgaria. In the Mediterranean, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, and Libya, 
had accepted 12 miles territorial sea and is also responded equally by the Turkish government. On the 
other hand, the width of the territorial sea remained 6 nautical miles in the Aegean since Greece had 
accepted 6 nautical miles, which did not necessitate the employment of the principle of reciprocity by the 
Turkish state in this respect.  
18
 Tozun Bahcheli. (1990), pp. 15-16. 
19
 The Dodecanese had been under Italian sovereignty since the Tripoli War in 1912, but was given to 
Greece in the end of the World War II. The islands were offered to Turkey by the British during the World 
War II if it was to join the Allied Powers; however Turkey had refused to enter the war. In the process of 
 13 
 
The relations of Greece and Turkey were still cooperative in the aftermath of the World 
War II with the new world order. The security considerations of the two Aegean states 
became identical against the Soviet Union, connecting them to the Western Alliance. 
Both states became beneficiaries of the Truman Doctrine, sent forces to Korea, and 
joined NATO in 1952. Until the incidents broke out in the late 1950’s in Cyprus, Greece 
and Turkey have shown great collaboration in their bilateral relations.   
 
 
1.6 Decline of Relations 
 
The relations between Greece and Turkey had deteriorated incrementally during the 
second half of the 20th century. The first disagreements started with ethnic conflicts in 
Cyprus, followed by several discords over the Aegean Sea. Not been solved since half a 
century, these issues remain to be the main source of conflict between the two Aegean 
states. 
 
 
1.6.1. Cyprus 
 
Cyprus had been under British administration since 1878, where two distinct national 
peoples lived together, namely the Muslim Turkish Cypriots and the Christian Orthodox 
                                                                                                                                                
ceding the islands, Greece had not refrained from demanding Gökçeada (Tenados) and Bozcaada (Imbros) 
and organizing demonstrations for this purpose. For details see Murat Hatipoğlu. (1996), pp. 233-250. 
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Greek Cypriots. Britain had explicitly recognized the two communities in the island 
through its government statements. As early as 1947 when the new Archbishop Leontios 
of Paphos was being elected, campaigns and demonstrations for Enosis (uniting the 
island with Greece) started on the island by the Greek Cypriots20. The Greek demand to 
unite the island with mainland Greece was a part of the Megali Idea and it was 
supported by the Orthodox Church21. In 1954, the Greek government applied to the 
United Nations for the right to self-determination to be given to the people of Cyprus, 
nevertheless, the UN General Assembly then decided not to discuss the situation22. In 
1960, the two communities on the island negotiated and signed the Zurich and London 
Agreements creating the independent state of Cyprus, with Britain, Greece and Turkey 
being guarantor powers of the state of affairs on the island23.  
 
The Greek Cypriots however regarded the establishment of the Republic as a step 
towards the ultimate aim of enosis, and soon started to destroy the balances created by 
the 1960 agreements. The Greek Cypriots resorted to violence in 1963 for this purpose, 
expelling the Turkish Cypriots from all government organs by pressure. Until 1974, 
when Turkey intervened to the island in accordance with its Treaty rights and 
obligations, massive human rights violations happened against the Turkish Cypriots, 
                                                 
20
 Murat Hatipoğlu. (1996), pp. 310-311. 
21
 According to K. C. Markides, Enosis was a local movement representing the heir of the Hellenic-
Byzantine Empire and it was initiated by the church. As the rivalry between the church and the 
communists ended with the end of World War II, church extended its influence in Greece and the idea of 
Enosis is embraced by the Greek people. See K.C. Markides. The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp.11-14. 
22
 The Greek appeal to the United Nations was rejected on the basis of the UN Charter Article 2(7), the 
principle of non-intervention to internal affairs of states. For details see Fahir Armaoğlu. Kıbrıs Meselesi 
1954-1959, (Ankara: Sevinç, 1963), pp. 70-94; Nancy Crawshaw. The Cyprus Revolt, (London: William 
Cloves and Sons, 1978), pp.83-89. 
23
 For further information on the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the terms of London and 
Zurich Agreements see Necati Ertekün, The Cyprus Dispute and The Birth of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus, (Oxford: University Press, 1984), pp.3-9. 
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rendering some 30.000 people homeless24. After the Greeks attempted to takeover 
Cyprus through a coup d’état organized by the junta in Athens and its collaborators in 
Cyprus, Turkey intervened in the island in order to put an end to the atrocities that were 
being committed against the Turkish people25. Since then, the island is divided into two; 
the Greek Cypriots residing in the South and the Turkish on the North26. On 13 February 
1975, under the leadership of the president of the Turkish Cypriot Administration Rauf 
Denktaş, Turkish Cypriots declared the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. Having been 
denied all their rights under the 1960 Constitution, on 15 November 1983, the Turkish 
Cypriot Assembly approved unanimously the declaration of independence and the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)27.   
 
This situation beginning in the late 1950’s totally changed the course of Greek-Turkish 
relations that had been going on peacefully about thirty years. The Cyprus dispute did 
not only pose a problem itself, but also restrained the bilateral relations of the two states 
especially on the Aegean issues as well as Turkey’s membership to the European 
Union28.  
 
 
                                                 
24
 Hakkı Akalın. Turkey and Greece, On the Way to Another War?, (Ankara: 1999), pp. 219-221. 
25
 After the intervention to the island, Turkey was regarded as an aggressor by the international 
community. For further details See the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550 and 
www.mfa.gov.tr  
26
 Although Turkey had acted under the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee, the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 3212 of 1 November 1974 mentioned Turkey as an occupier and stated that the Greek Cypriot 
Administration was the only legitimate government on the island.  
27
 For details on the political structure of TRNC, see Clement H. Dodd. The Political, Social and 
Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, (Cambridgeshire: The Eothan Press, 1993), pp.103-218. 
28For peace efforts on the island, see the Report of the Secretary General on his Mission of Good Offices 
in Cyprus, 2004/437 (2004). 
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1.6.2 Continental Shelf Dispute 
 
One other problem, which forms the central question of this thesis, arose from petroleum 
research activities and licenses in the Aegean Sea in the 1970’s. There had been no 
delimitation of continental shelf in the Aegean Sea when in 1963 Greece started to 
conduct research work and granted exploration licenses in the Aegean outside Greek 
territorial waters. Turkey, on its part, started its first seismic research activity in the 
Aegean in 1968. Along with intensifying Greek exploitation activities, Turkey in 1973 
granted licenses to the Turkish Petroleum Corp (TPAO). As more permits were granted 
by the two Aegean states to conduct research on the Aegean, both states started to 
question the validity of the permits issued by the governments.  
 
This matter soon became very intense and problematic regarding the delimitation of the 
continental shelf in the Aegean. In addition to the other problems in the Aegean and the 
Cyprus dispute, the issue of continental shelf became one of the most intractable matters 
that have been left unresolved between Greece and Turkey and directly affecting the 
bilateral relations of the two.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
AEGEAN SEA 
 
 
The Aegean Sea lies at the core of most of the political relations between Greece and 
Turkey. It is not only a sea that divides the two mainlands, but it is also a main source of 
conflict dividing the two states in several political, economic and legal matters. The 
Aegean Sea itself needs to be analyzed in detail geographically as well as legally so as to 
have a better understanding of the conflict between these two neighboring Aegean states. 
In this respect, the outstanding nature of the Aegean Sea and the way its natural 
characteristics are regarded by Greece and Turkey are of outmost importance29.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 For socio-economic characteristics and the underwater structure of the Aegean Sea and the Aegean 
islands, see Yücel Acer. The Aegean Maritime Disputes and International Law, (Wiltshire: Ashgate, 
2003), pp. 5-16.  
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2.1 Geographical Factors 
 
Maritime boundary issues between Greece and Turkey are very much problematic due to 
the special features of the Aegean Sea. Having a very unique political geography, the sea 
itself creates difficulties in delimitation because of its narrow width and the existence of 
many islands, islets and rocks30.  
 
The Aegean Sea forms part of the Mediterranean Sea with a total surface of maritime 
areas of 101.321 sq nautical miles (187.647 sq kilometers)31. The sea is bordered by the 
coasts of Greece and Turkey, both adjacently and oppositely. Greek coasts to the Aegean 
are 1500 nautical miles (2750 kilometers) long, excluding the islands; whereas the 
Turkish coasts to the Aegean are nearly of 1300 nautical miles (2400 kilometers). The 
Aegean Sea has approximately 350 nautical miles length and 100-200 nautical miles 
width, from east to west. It is bounded by Greece in the West and by Turkey in the east, 
and by both in the North, mainly by the Greek coasts. At the south, the limit of the 
Aegean Sea can be described by a line joining the southwestern coast of Turkey and 
southwestern coast of Greece: the Akyar Cape, Northern Rhodes, the islands of 
Karpathos, Crete, Andikithira and Southeastern Peleponnesse in mainland Greece32. 
This semi-enclosed sea therefore gives no direct access to any other state.  
                                                 
30
 Yüksel Inan and Yücel Acer. The Aegean Disputes in Ali Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfı Taşhan (ed.s), The 
Europeanization of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls, (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 
2004), p.1.  
31
 1 nautical mile equals to 1, 852 kilometers, as a universally accepted measurement in the law of the sea.  
32
 Deniz Bölükbaşı. (2004), pp. 87-88. There does not exist an internationally agreed limit of the Aegean 
Sea, however, for hydrographic purposes, in a study carried out in 1986 by the International Hydrographic 
Organization (IHO) the Aegean Sea was defined as described above.  
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The Aegean Sea includes approximately 3000 different islands, islets and rocks, mostly 
under Greek sovereignty, of which around 100 are inhabited33. Although many are 
small, a number of Greek islands of various sizes are located of the eastern shores of 
Anatolia34.  They are dispersed all over the Aegean; nevertheless the islands can be 
grouped under five categories: the North Sporades, the Cyclades, the Strait Region 
Islands, the Saruhan Islands and the Menteşe (Dodacanese) Islands35. The last three 
groups of islands can also be named as the “Eastern Aegean Islands”, located in close 
proximity to the Turkish shores in the east part of the Aegean Sea36.  The number of the 
Eastern Aegean Islands is considerable; nowhere else do foreign-controlled islands and 
their territorial sea cover nearly 85% of a long mainland coastline. Some of the islands 
under Greek sovereignty are as close as few nautical miles off the shoreline, resulting in 
Turkey’s coast to the Aegean Sea to be encircled to an excessive extent by the Greek 
islands and their adjacent territorial seas37.  
 
Considering the proximity of the Greek islands to mainland Turkey as well as the 
extraordinary configuration of the sea, the Aegean constitutes a special circumstance for 
purposes of maritime delimitation. Due to its complex geography and singular structure, 
it not only constitutes a unique sea that poses difficulties in maritime delimitation, but it 
                                                 
33
 For governing treaties of the Aegean islands see Jon M. Van Dyke “An Analysis of the Aegean 
Disputes under International Law”, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 36:63-117, (2005), 
pp.64-69. 
34
 Mark B. Feldman. International Maritime Boundary Delimitation: Law and Practice from the Gulf of 
Maine to the Aegean Sea, in Seyfi Taşhan (ed.), Aegean Issues: Problems – Legal and Political Matrix 
Conference Papers, (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1995), pp. 15-17. 
35
 Yüksel Đnan. The Aegean Disputes and Efforts to Solve Them, (forthcoming), p. 1. 
36
 Yüksel Đnan. (forthcoming) p. 1. 
37
 Deniz Bölükbaşı. (2004), p. 90. 
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also creates such an odd situation that virtually no such peculiar configuration exits in 
other parts of the world38. This situation in turn directly affects various maritime 
delimitation difficulties in the Aegean Sea.  
 
2.2 Bilateral Problems in the Aegean Sea 
 
Greece and Turkey has many problems regarding maritime delimitation in the Aegean 
Sea. All these problematic issues derive from the fact that the Aegean Sea forms an 
exception to all common rules of international law. International agreements form an 
important part of the sources of international law. Four Conventions were signed in 
relation to the law of the sea in 1958: Convention on the High Seas; Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of 
the Living Resource of the High Seas and Convention on the Continental Shelf. In 1982, 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea was signed which largely superceded the earlier 
Conventions. Although all issues of the law of the sea are covered in the these UN 
Conventions that were signed in 1958 and 1982 respectively, the issues related to the 
Aegean Sea needs to be examined under the area of “special circumstances” due to its 
exceptional geographical characteristics.  
 
The problematic matters in the Aegean Sea can be classified as: 
 The delimitation of the territorial sea 
 The delimitation of the continental shelf 
 The air space issues 
                                                 
38
 See Appendix D for the map of the Aegean Sea.  
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 Issues related to the demilitarized statues of Eastern Aegean islands 
 The uncertainty over the status of certain geographical features in the Aegean 
Sea39.   
 
This research will only deal with the issue of continental shelf, however in order to have 
a better grasp on the issue, it is also important here to mention briefly about the 
delimitation of the territorial sea in the Aegean Sea. 
 
The territorial sea is the maritime area adjacent to a coastal state where the state can 
exercise full sovereignty over these waters and the airspace above, just as over its land 
territory. Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Law of Sea of 1982 provides that 
“Every state has the right to establish the breadth of the territorial sea up to a limit not 
exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from the baselines determined in accordance with 
this Convention”40. 
 
The precise delimitation of territorial sea is very important in defining the continental 
shelf areas in the Aegean. This is because; the concept of the continental shelf is defined 
as composing the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond the 
territorial sea, which is measured from the baselines41. Thus and inevitably, the length of 
                                                 
39
 For further information on the bilateral disputes between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean, see Yüksel 
Inan and Yücel Acer. (2004). 
40
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Article 3. The whole text of the 1982 
Convention can be found in E.D. Brown. The International Law of the Sea, Vol. II, (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1994) and www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm, (The United Nations website for the Division for 
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea).  
41
 See UN Convention on the Law of The Sea 1982 Article 76/3, for a definition of continental shelf. See 
Appendix E for the relevant provisions of UNCLOS.  
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the territorial sea directly affects the areas that would be left to be called as continental 
shelf.  
 
As early as 1936, Greece had fixed the extent of its territorial seas at 6 nautical miles, 
including the Aegean. Then in 1964, the Turkish government declared 6 nautical miles 
territorial sea, stipulating that in relation to those states claiming territorial sea beyond 
this limit, Turkey would determine its territorial sea on the basis of reciprocity. Since 
then the two Aegean states exercise a 6 nautical mile breadth of territorial waters. 
Nevertheless, after ratifying the UN Convention on the Law of The Sea in 1995, the 
Greek government also stated that “Greece has an alienable right to extend its territorial 
sea up to 12 nautical miles at any time”42.   
 
Under the present 6 nautical mile breadth of territorial sea, Greece holds nearly 43.5% of 
the waters of the Aegean Sea whereas for Turkey this percentage is 7.5. Should the 
territorial sea be extended to 12 nautical miles as Greece advocates, the Greek territorial 
sea will increase to 71.5% and Turkish territorial sea to only 8.7%, turning the Aegean 
into a Greek sea43. Leaving very little area for Turkish territorial waters and for Turkish 
passage, this situation also affects the amount of high seas left in the Aegean Sea, 
leaving the amount of high seas in the whole Aegean approximately to 20%. Besides, 
any change in the extent of the territorial sea on the Greek side, would considerably 
decrease the areas left to be claimed as continental shelf. Thus, it is vital that a precision 
                                                 
42
 Greek Parliament minutes, 31 May 1995 cited in Bölükbaşı. (2004), p. 134. 
43
 Hakkı Akalın. (1999), p. 145. 
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on the territorial sea be maintained in the first place, in order not to affect the continental 
shelf issue afterwards. 
 
Nevertheless, considering its alienable right to extend its territorial sea to 12 nautical 
miles, Greece simply ignores the dramatically decreased amount of areas left for high 
seas as well as for Turkish territorial seas. Some scholars even argue that the territorial 
sea claims in some parts of the contested Eastern Aegean should be rolled back to 3 
nautical miles in order to provide the navigational and overflight freedoms that are so 
important to Turkey and to third states44.  
 
The fact that Greece disregards that there exists a problem in the delimitation of the 
territorial sea, even complicates the issue of continental shelf. The Greek government 
refuses that there exists any other problem than the continental shelf in the Aegean, 
whereas Turkey insists that the sum of all disputes in the Aegean between the two states 
should be dealt together, in order to have a solid and long-lasting solution for each of 
them.  
                                                 
44
 Jon M. Van Dyke. “An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes under International Law”, Ocean Development 
and International Law, 36:63-117, (2005), pp. 87-88. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
CONTINENTAL SHELF AS A LEGAL CONCEPT 
 
 
Neither a practical nor a legal definition existed for the concept of continental shelf at 
the beginning of the 20th century. The continental shelf started to be debated years after 
the question of the extension of the territorial sea was discussed in the international 
community and only after the exploitation of the resources on the seabed and subsoil 
were on the agenda.  
 
3.1 Development of the Legal Concept of Continental Shelf  
 
 By the year 1930, pressure from a considerable number of states to extend their 
jurisdiction seawards was mounting, reflected in the Hague Conference for the 
codification of International Law. Many states were in favor of a wider zone of 
territorial sea; however this was not the case in continental shelf. Since resources on the 
seabed and subsoil were not drawing the attention of states and there was no concept of 
 25 
continental shelf in the 1930‘s, the first pronunciation of a continental shelf happened 
only after the World War II. 
 
On 28 September 1945, then president of the United States Harry Truman issued a 
proclamation declaring that the US government “regards the natural resources of the 
subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the 
coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction 
and control”45. The continental shelf was further explained by a press release of the 
government stating that “generally submerged land which is contiguous to the continent 
and which is governed by no more than 100 fathoms (200 meters) of water is considered 
as the continental shelf”46.  
 
The Truman Proclamation was the initial point in the development of the legal concept 
of the continental shelf, as it provided a model for a succession of similar claims by 
other states. Numerous unilateral acts with a variety of scopes and content were declared 
by other states anxious to take advantage of the new practice initiated by the US 
government. Nevertheless, no provisions for delimitation with neighboring states were 
envisaged.  
 
In early 1950’s, for a definite delimitation of the continental shelf, the International Law 
Commission had only mentioned a zone of seabed “where the depth of the superjacent 
                                                 
45
 Truman Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 cited in International Boundary Cases: The 
Continental Shelf (Cambridge: Grotius, 1992) p. 2. 
46
 US Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, p. 485 cited in The Law of the Sea: The Definition of the 
Continental Shelf, (New York: United Nations, 1993), p. 1. 
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waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil”47. 
Having no reference to a fixed depth, the approach became unfeasible with regards to 
the rapid development in technology. In fact, it can be said that every delimitation 
dispute between states has arisen along with the availability of technology to exploit the 
seabed and the subsoil, as it is the case in the Aegean Sea continental shelf dispute.    
 
 
3.2 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf  
 
The United Nations Conference on the Law of Sea that was held in 1958, along with 
other issues of the law of the sea, attempted to formulate an agreed legal definition of the 
continental shelf, since delegates were reluctant to accept uncertain criteria as 
“exploitability” for a description48. A compromise was reached including both the 
International Law Commission’s exploitability criteria and more precise depth criteria in 
the definition of the continental shelf.  The text of 1958 Geneva Continental Shelf 
Convention Article 1 gives the definition as follows49: 
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf" is used as referring 
(a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but 
outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that 
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of 
the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar 
submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. 
                                                 
47
 International Boundary Cases: The Continental Shelf (1992) p. 3. 
48
 International Boundary Cases: The Continental Shelf (1992) p. 3. 
49
 The complete text of 1958 Geneva Continental Shelf Convention can be found in www.oceanlaw.net 
and Appendix F.  
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This definition contained the criteria of adjacency to the coast and of exploitability, 
however was still regarded as imprecise and open-ended nature in terms of delimitation. 
Moreover, as for the debates on effective control and exploitation, the coastal state rights 
over the shelf were not based on notions of occupation or expressed claims made by 
states. Thus, Article 2 of the Geneva Convention proposed that states had this right ipso 
jure: 
1. The coastal state exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.  
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are exclusive in the sense 
that if the coastal state does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural 
resources, no one may undertake these activities, or make a claim to the 
continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal State.  
3. The rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not depend on 
occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.  
 
In addition, in account of neighboring states, the Convention stated in Article 6 that:  
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more 
States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf 
appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In 
the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special 
circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is 
equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea of each State is measured.  
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent 
States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement 
between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is 
justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by 
application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.  
 
This article is important because of the fact that it gives reference to three elements in 
case of conflict in the delimitation of the continental shelf: firstly a boundary settled by 
agreement; secondly a boundary drawn using the median line or the principle of 
equidistance; and thirdly in cases of special circumstances, another boundary line 
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justified by these special circumstances. As stated in Conference drafts, this meant that 
the equidistant rule was the general rule; however in special circumstances another 
justified boundary line will be the basis for delimitation as necessitated by any 
exceptional configuration of the coast, as well as the presence of islands or of navigable 
channels50. Therefore the special circumstances element would prevail over the 
equidistance principle when such exceptional characteristics exist.  
 
The legal concept of continental shelf laid down in 1958 was first considered by the ICJ 
in 1969, with the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. When the Court was asked to lay 
down the principles of international law applicable to the delimitation of the continental 
shelf in the North Sea between the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark; it also used the 
term “natural prolongation”. This situation in turn had implications on the subsequent 
jurisprudence, changing the focus from the water depth and exploitability criteria to the 
geological characteristics of the seabed51. In addition, it referred to an element of 
proportionality for delimitation between the extent of the continental shelf areas 
appertaining to that state and the length of its coast measured in the general direction of 
the coast line52.  
 
In the following years, the importance of natural prolongation decreased, particularly 
because of those states that deal with a very limited natural continental shelf extension.  
On the other hand, the Court’s statements on the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
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 E. D. Brown. (1994), p. 162. 
51
 International Boundary Cases: The Continental Shelf, (1992), pp. 4-5. 
52
 International Boundary Cases: The Continental Shelf, (1992), pp. 11-12. The Case will be dealt with in 
detail in Chapter Seven. 
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stressing other factors to be taken into account gained more importance. Those factors, 
including the configuration of the coast, the psychical structure and resources of the 
shelf and the principle of proportionality were seen more significant for the delimitation 
of the continental shelf in accordance with equitable principles. The Court had viewed 
delimitation only by the criteria of equidistance as a mistake and thus wanted to avoid it 
by resorting to these aspects53.  
 
In the UK/France Continental Shelf Case of 1977, the arbitration court once again 
asserted the consideration of special circumstances in delimitation of the continental 
shelf. The fact that the Channel Islands of Britain being so close to the French mainland 
coast was regarded as a special circumstance54. Thus, the Court gave its award in view 
of both Article 6 of the 1958 Convention and on customary law; regarding both having 
the same goal, the establishment of a boundary in accordance with equitable principles55.  
 
   
3.3 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
 
The need for an internationally agreed legal definition for continental shelf delimitation 
started to be felt in several international circles as well as in the Third United Nations 
                                                 
53
 International Boundary Cases: The Continental Shelf, (1992), pp. 14-15. 
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 Donat Pharand and Umberto Leanza (ed.s), The Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone 
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Conference on the Law of the Sea56. It was generally agreed that an international regime 
needed to be established for the deep seabed and it was necessary to overcome the vague 
points and uncertainties of the definition for the outer limits of the shelf made in the 
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf in 195857.  
 
In line with these considerations the adopted text in the end of the Conference gave a 
more precise definition and adjusted methods for delimitation. Article 76(1) of the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Sea contained the following new definition of the 
continental shelf: 
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to 
a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does 
not extend up to that distance58. 
 
An important point is taken into account in this provision: it does accept only the link of 
the continental shelf with the physical fact of natural prolongation, but it also introduces 
the criteria of distance regardless of whether there exists a natural prolongation in the 
psychical sense or not, thus enabling states to claim a continental shelf up to 200 
nautical miles59. As for delimitation between states, Article 83/1 reads as follows:  
The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts shall be affected by agreement on the basis of international law, as 
                                                 
56
 After the first Conference on the law of the sea in 1958, a second one concerning the territorial seas was 
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referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in 
order to achieve an equitable solution60. 
 
The more detailed provisions of Article 6 of the 1958 Convention were therefore 
abandoned for the vague instruction to adjudicators to achieve an equitable solution. The 
ICJ stated in one of its related cases that, “The principles and rules applicable to the 
delimitation of continental shelf areas are those which are appropriate to bring about an 
equitable result”61. Consequently, the principle of equity has become of more 
importance with regards to equidistance and any other method of delimitation. Since the 
1982 Convention, the Court regards a list of factors and circumstances as relevant to the 
application of the principle of equity such as adjacency; coastal configuration; 
disproportionality; distance; enclavement; equidistance; interests of third states in the 
area; natural prolongation; past conduct of the parties in the area, proportionality; 
reduced affect for islands and unity of single state management have all been observed 
in the decisions of the ICJ in the application of the principle of equity in continental 
shelf delimitation62. Among these, nearly half of these factors need to be considered in 
the case of delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean.  
 
In sum, there is no single rule applicable to all delimitation cases. Nonetheless, the 
manner in which the 1958 and 1982 Conventions are interpreted along with customary 
international law, points to a single practice that is to be affected “…by agreement, in 
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accordance with equitable principles and taking into account of all relevant 
circumstances in order to achieve an equitable solution”63. 
 
Today, Greece is a party to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention and the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Sea whereas Turkey is not, since it did not ratify either of 
the two Conventions. Nevertheless, nowadays most of the provisions of the 1982 Law of 
the Sea Convention are regarded as customary international law, with a binding effect on 
all states, due to a wide acceptance in the international community and considerable 
amount of state practice and ICJ judgments approving so.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
CONTINENTAL SHELF DISPUTE BETWEEN GREECE AND 
TURKEY 
 
 
The problem in the Aegean is largely to do with the special configuration of the sea that 
does not give way to the direct application of the legal norms. It is a semi-enclosed sea 
whose east-west length is shorter than 400 nautical miles, and it almost gives no chance 
in all areas for delimitation of the shelf areas to be derived from the notion of natural 
prolongation. Thus, continental shelf has been an ongoing dispute. When the right to 
make exploitations for natural resources in this area is the case, the issue gains more 
importance considering the special geographic characteristics that are equally important 
to both Greece and Turkey in terms of strategic, economic and political interests.  
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4.1 Historical Background of the Incidents (1963-1976) 
 
The continental shelf dispute between Greece and Turkey has a bearing on the overall 
equilibrium of rights and interests in the Aegean. Although the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 
had the intention to provide the equilibrium, the concept of continental shelf did not 
exist at the time of the settlement. Once the technology developed so as to make 
research on the seabed and subsoil, and the two coastal states acquired the capabilities to 
exploit the continental shelf, the dispute arose as to who will have the jurisdiction of the 
area. 
 
The Aegean continental shelf not being delimited through an agreement between Greece 
and Turkey, the first conduct in the area was realized in 1963. That year, Greece 
conducted research work and granted exploration licenses in the Aegean outside its 
territorial waters. The licenses covered the maritime areas and their subsoil around 
Rodos (Rhodes) and Kerpe (Karpathos) islands in the southern Aegean64.  
 
From 1969 onwards, Greek exploration and exploitation activities spread to off-shore 
areas in the northern and eastern Aegean. Three foreign petroleum companies were 
granted licenses by the Greek government to explore the areas in the northern Aegean, 
outside the limits of the territorial sea of the Limni (Lemnos) Island. In 1970, this 
conduct was furthered around the islands of Sakız (Chios), Midilli (Lesvos), Limni 
(Lemnos) and Semendirek (Samothrace), and drilling activities were carried out by 
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Greece mainly in Thessalonica Bay, and off the coasts of Limni (Lemnos) and Taşoz 
(Thasos)65.   
 
On the other hand, first seismic activities in the Aegean on the part of Turkey started in 
1968. As a response to intensified Greek activities in the area, in 1973 Turkey decided to 
grant licenses to the Turkish State Petroleum Company (TPAO). A government decision 
in this respect was published in the Turkish Official Gazette granting the TPAO the right 
to execute petroleum exploration activities in 27 regions in the Aegean continental 
shelf66. These areas did no go beyond the median line between the Turkish and Greek 
mainlands.  
 
In the first half of 1974, Turkey started to carry out magnotemetric research in the 
Northern Aegean, within the areas covered by the permits that had been granted. In June 
and July the same year, the Turkish government granted additional oil exploration 
concessions to the TPAO67. These new permits extended the area to be exploited further 
to the west of Greek islands; however it still did not pass the median line. Moreover, 
other permits were granted in the southern Aegean to the North and North West of the 
islands of Nicaria and the Dodecanese, including the west and east of Rhodes68. In May 
1974 and February 1976 Turkey put this decision into practice by sending survey ships 
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to conduct magnetometric and seismic tests along the western limits of the concession 
areas69. 
 
Greece soon started to question the validity of the permits issued by the Turkish 
government and reserved the sovereign rights of Greece over the continental shelf of the 
islands for the purpose of exploration and exploitation. The Greek government alleged 
that the area that the permits covered intruded the continental shelf of certain Greek 
islands; namely, Samothrace, Lemnos, Ag. Efstratios, Lesvos, Chios, Psara and 
Andipsara70. From this moment onwards, tensions gradually arose between the two 
Aegean states and the period between 7 February 1974 and 9 August 1976 was marked 
by mounted tension and intense diplomatic exchanges, which strived for improvement 
but resulted in impasse.   
 
 
4.2 Negotiations for a Settlement 
 
In order to reach a settlement and ameliorate relations in the Aegean the two 
neighboring states engaged into a series of talks and meetings. In this period, twenty one 
Verbal Notes were exchanged between Greece and Turkey. Meetings were held in Prime 
Ministerial and Foreign Ministerial levels in 1975 and two expert meetings were held in 
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Bern in 197671. These meetings resulted in the signing of the Bern Agreement on 11 
November 1976, which concluded the negotiations.  
 
 
4.2.1 Talks between Governments 
 
In its three notes of 7 February 1974, 24 May 1974 and 14 June 1974, Greece reserved 
its position of questioning the validity of Turkish permits for exploitation in the 
concerned areas, identifying the areas as Greek continental shelf and did not oppose the 
dispute to be settled along with international law that was codified by the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the continental Shelf. In reply, Turkey declared that, the Greek islands 
lying very close to the Turkish coast do not possess their own continental shelf and as 
for the delimitation, it was willing to solve the matter within the framework of 
international law72. When Greece protested the new exploration permits issued by the 
Turkish government of 18 July 1974, Turkey stated that the areas covered were part of 
the Turkish continental shelf and added that a mutually accepted solution regarding the 
delimitation of the concerned areas should be reached through negotiations.  
 
On 27 January 1975, Greece proposed that the differences over the applicable law be 
referred to the ICJ. In response, with its Verbal Note of 6 February 1975, Turkey stated 
that it was favorably considering the Greek government’s proposal to submit the matter 
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to the ICJ, and to elaborate the terms under which specific matters shall be referred; the 
Turkish government proposed high-level talks to be initiated between the two 
governments. In addition, Turkey pointed to the fact that because of the political nature 
and the vital importance of the subject, it was essential for these talks to be held in prime 
ministerial level. Greece, with a note dated 10 February 1975, agreed that following 
preparations accordingly, talks should be held so as to draft the special agreement to 
refer the dispute to the ICJ.  
 
Consequently, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Greece and Turkey met on 17-19 May 
1975 in Rome, where the Greek side submitted a draft text of a “special agreement” for 
consideration and negotiation. The Turkish government reasserted that meaningful 
negotiations on the matter should take place firstly, and argued that other possible means 
of peaceful settlement could be considered when all primary means of substantial 
negotiations were exhausted73.  
 
In this context, Turkey put forward the consideration of a “joint exploitation” scheme. In 
addition, the Turkish side proposed to initially work out a geomorphological map of the 
Aegean seabed in order to lay down basic criteria that would apply to the delimitation of 
the continental shelf between Greece and Turkey. In the end of the meeting, the joint 
communiqué issued stated that “the issues related to the Aegean continental shelf were 
discussed and initial study of the text of special agreement to submit the case to the 
International Court of Justice was undertaken”74. 
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Right after this meeting, the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis and Turkish 
Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel met in 31 May 1975 in Brussels. Following this 
meeting the joint declaration stated once again that it was decided that “the problems 
dividing the two countries should be resolved peacefully through the negotiations and 
the issue of the Aegean continental shelf through International Court of the Hague”75. In 
this respect, they also decided to speed up the meeting of experts on the continental shelf 
and airspace issues in the Aegean.  
 
Nevertheless, in relation to the convening of the meeting of experts decided by the Prime 
Ministers, several problems arose as to the discussions that would be held at the expert 
level. Greece insisted that the meeting to be held on 25-27 September 1975 would 
exclusively be limited to the drafting of a special agreement whereas this stand was in 
total contradiction with the political agreements that were made. This situation in turn, 
prevented the realization of the experts meeting. As a response to the matter, the Turkish 
government, with another Note on 30 September 1975, argued that it was decided at the 
Prime Ministerial level that the two parties would initiate bilateral negotiations 
concerning all their problems. Moreover, it reminded that those issues related to the 
Aegean continental shelf areas that could not be solved by negotiations would be jointly 
submitted to the Court. The Turkish Government once again underlined that the best 
way of overcoming these problems and solving the differences was through bilateral 
negotiations and a just and fair agreement should be based on equitable principles76.  
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In the consequent Notes that were exchanged between Greece and Turkey, Greece 
asserted that it had previously been agreed that the Anatolian coats and therefore 
Turkey’s continental shelf do not possess continuity and called upon the early drafting of 
the special agreement in order to be submitted to the ICJ77. Turkey, on the other hand, 
opposed to the Greek interpretation and invited Greece to conduct meaningful 
negotiations78.  
 
 
4.2.2 Bern Expert Meetings 
 
Under these circumstances, the first meeting of experts between Greece and Turkey took 
place in Bern on 31 January-2 February 1976. Although the meeting provided both sides 
with the opportunity of clarifying and declaring their respective positions, no progress 
was achieved in the meeting.  
 
The Turkish side mainly argued in the meeting that firstly parties should make an 
agreement of principle not to extend their territorial sea beyond the limits of the 
prevailing time as a condition “sine qua non”79. In addition it asserted that the balance 
that was established by the Lausanne Treaty should be maintained in the Aegean. It 
further argued that for the purpose of accurate delimitation a definition of the Aegean 
Sea had to be defined in line with geophysical and geological notions. Moreover, Turkey 
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put forward that it had not been a party to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf and therefore it was not opposable against Turkey by Greece who was 
a party to it80.  
 
The Greek side, on the other hand, argued that it had the right to extend its territorial sea 
to 12 nautical miles and would not abandon this right as the Law of the Sea Conference 
had unanimously decided accordingly. Furthermore, Greece emphasized the territorial 
and political unity of its state and that every island had its own continental shelf. In this 
respect, Greece proposed that the dividing line of continental shelf in the Aegean should 
be a median line between the Greek Islands and the Turkish mainland81.  
 
In response, the Turkish delegation argued for the geological continuation of the 
mainland of Turkey in the Aegean, putting forward that a very deep basin extending in 
the north-west south-east direction in fact separated the geological reflections of the 
Greek and Turkish mainlands. Therefore, the diagonal zone divided the Aegean into two 
parts that would be appropriate to take as a reference in continental shelf delimitation. 
The Greek side rejected the geological dissertations arguing that the dispute was one of a 
legal character. As for the joint exploitation offer on the part of Turkey, Greece set 
delimitation as a precondition to considered possibilities of such an exploitation and 
                                                 
80
 U. Leanza and L. Sico “Mediterranean Continental Shelf; Delimitation and Regimes”, International and 
Legal Sources, Vol. 2, Book IV, (New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1988) pp-1556-1557 cited in  
Deniz Bölükbaşı. (2004), p. 247. 
81
 Deniz Bölükbaşı. (2004), pp. 246-255.  
 42 
repeated its stand that the issue should be referred to international adjudication. Under 
these conditions, the Bern Meeting ended with no results82.  
 
The second meeting of experts between Greece and Turkey took place once again in 
Bern in 19-10 June 1976. The Greek position in the second meeting was that, 
considering the first meeting, there existed a deadlock and the matter had to be referred 
to the ICJ. Greece also suggested that, a common definition of the dispute and location 
of the concerning continental shelf area should be indicated. According to the Greek 
delegation, the dispute did not involve the whole Aegean and they refused to accept 
Turkey’s suggestion of a common definition of the Aegean Sea.  
 
The Turkish delegation on its part made a presentation on the joint exploration scheme 
under an autonomous international regional authority, which was refused by the Greek 
who insisted that the issue could not be taken into account unless the continental shelf 
was delimited. In addition, Turkey claimed that there was a need to take all elements 
together in determining the delimitation of the continental shelf such as geological and 
geomorphological elements concerning the coasts of the two states and the depths of the 
Aegean Sea. Greece refused the suggestion as well as defining the Aegean Sea for the 
purpose of delimitation of the continental shelf areas. The Second Bern Meeting, like the 
first one, ended without any achievements.  
 
Following unsuccessful meetings without positive outcomes, on 13 July 1976, the 
Turkish National Security Council recommended the government that research activities 
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would be carried out by seismic research vessel MTA Sismik-I in the Turkish territorial 
sea and the high seas in the Aegean83. In the following month, the seismic research 
vessel MTA Sismik-I engaged in seismic exploration in the Aegean high seas. This was 
responded by the Greek government on 7 August 1976 with a Note protesting “the 
violation of its rights” and requesting Turkey to take all necessary measures to ensure 
this violation would not occur once again in the future.  
 
The next day the Turkish government rejected the protest which it considered as having 
no bases and totally unacceptable. It also asserted that the research activities would 
continue as it was planned and consequently the Turkish research vessel escorted by a 
Turkish minesweeper and an aircraft, carried on its exploration activities. As opposed to 
the scientific research activities undertaken by Turkey, Greece turned to the United 
Nations Security Council and the ICJ.  
 
 
4.3 Dispute in the International Scene 
 
On 10 August 1976, Greece simultaneously appealed to the United Nations and also 
instituted proceedings in the ICJ. These applications constitute the only occasion where 
the Aegean dispute was referred to the United Nations for debate and appropriate action.  
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4.3.1 Greek Appeal to the United Nations Security Council 
 
The Greek application to the UN Security Council was based on the claim of a 
dangerous situation that was generated by the Turkish explorations on the Aegean 
continental shelf that Greece considers its own and that this situation was a threat to 
international peace and security84.  In its appeal, Greece put forward Article 35 of the 
UN Charter, asking for the Council to reassure the peace that had been threatened by 
Turkey because of its exploration activities in the Aegean85.  Greece founded the 
endangered situation of maintaining peace, by the maneuvers of Turkish air and naval 
forces and their accompanying the research vessel Sismik-I and the responsive military 
measures taken by the Greek government86.  
 
Turkey, in reply, once again stated its position that the Greek claims on the continental 
shelf were ill founded where the Continental Shelf was yet to be delimited. Turkey also 
recalled that its own vessel was harassed by the vessels and aircraft that belonged to 
Greece. Moreover, Turkey complained that Greece had militarized the Eastern Aegean 
Islands in violation of the Lausanne Treaty of 192387. Consequently, Turkey appealed 
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the Council to invite Greece into meaningful negotiations and demanded Greece to 
demilitarize the concerned islands in the path to put an end to the threat to peace and 
security in the region.  
 
On 25 August 1976, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 395 (1976) that urged 
both parties “to do everything in their power to reduce the present tensions in the area so 
that the negotiating process may be facilitated”88. The Resolution also called for the 
continuation of direct negotiations and invited both parties “to continue to take into 
account the contribution that appropriate judicial means, in particular the ICJ, are 
qualified to make to the settlement of any remaining legal differences which may 
identify in connection with their present dispute89. 
 
In this context, the Council emphasized the importance of meaningful negotiations 
between Greece and Turkey as a primary means of settlement and indicated the 
availability of the ICJ along with the course of these negotiations. It is also worth 
mentioning that the Council did not attempt to deal with the substance of the matter, but 
it only suggested a framework for the dispute to be resolved.  
 
 
4.3.2 Greek Request of Indication of Interim Measures 
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At the same time, Greece had filed a request to the Court, for interim measures of 
protection, requesting the Court to direct that the governments of Greece and Turkey 
shall, until a final judgment on the case has been reached, “refrain from all exploration 
activity or any scientific research” and “from taking further military measures or actions 
which may endanger their peaceful relations”90.  
 
The Greek request was founded on Article 33 of the General Act of 1928 for the Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes, the Article 41 of the Statute of the ICJ, and Article 66 of the 
Court’s Rules of Procedure. As for justifying its request, Greece put forward that the 
Turkish vessel Sismik-I was operating illegally upon Greek continental shelf; this 
exploration on the part of Turkey was causing “irreparable damage” and if continued it 
would intensify the dispute and disrupt the friendly relations between the two states, 
leading to military measures or actions with a threat to international peace and 
security91. Greece also stated the “extreme urgency” of the request by mentioning the 
sizeable arm forces of both countries facing each other throughout this process92.  
 
In its decision of 11 September 1976, the Court denied Greece’s request for interim 
measures on the grounds that there were no sufficient risk of irreparable prejudice to 
Greece’s rights to require exercise of its power to grant interim measures of protection93. 
The Court found that there were no threat of such an injury and thus no need or 
justification on interim measures of protection. More importantly, the Court stated that 
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the areas of the continental shelf in the Aegean are “areas in dispute”, therefore the 
Turkish activities could not be considered as an infringement upon the rights of Greece; 
where it was unclear whether these activates had taken place in areas that appertain to 
Greece.  
 
 
4.3.3 Greek Application to the International Court of Justice 
 
By unilateral application, Greece had also instituted proceedings in the ICJ against 
Turkey, relating to a dispute concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf 
appertaining to Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea, and concerning the respective 
legal rights of those states to explore and exploit the Aegean continental shelf. The 
Greek application had a restrictive attitude in that it limited the dispute to the continental 
shelf adjacent to the Greek islands and not concerning any other part of the Aegean or 
seabed thereof.94. In this context, Greece claimed that the explorations carried out by the 
Turkish government had intruded the continental shelf of the Greek islands of 
Samothrace, Lemnos, Agios Efstratios, Lesvos, Chios, Psara and Andipsara. In its 
application Greece also argued that the dispute could not have been resolved through 
negotiations between Greece and Turkey.  
 
Greece put forward two alternative bases on which the jurisdiction of the Court could be 
founded. The first was Article 17 of the 1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes, which provided for the submission of disputes to Permanent Court of 
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International Justice (PCIJ). This was to be accompanied by Article 37 of the Statute of 
the ICJ, which effectively substituted the International Court of Justice for the 
Permanent Court. Greece had acceded to the General Act in 1931 and Turkey in 1934, 
both with reservations, and neither state had denounced it, resulting in Greek claim that 
it was still in force for both of them.  
 
The second basis of jurisdiction relied upon by Greece was the Brussels Joint 
Communiqué of 31 May 1975. Including the statement that the two Prime Ministers 
“decided that those problems should be resolved peacefully by means of negotiations 
and as regards the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea by the International Court at The 
Hague”, Greece claimed that both had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.  
 
In accordance with these two bases, Greece requested the Court to adjudge and declare 
that Greece was entitled to the continental shelf mentioned above, what the course of 
boundary between the portions of the continental shelf appertaining to Greece and 
Turkey would be, that Greece had right to exercise its sovereign rights over these areas 
and Turkey did not, that Turkish activities here constituted infringements over the 
sovereign and exclusive rights of Greece and that Turkey shall not continue any further 
activities within the areas of continental shelf which the Court would adjudge appertain 
to Greece95. 
 
As for the Turkish observations concerning the Greek claims, Turkey stated that it had 
been willing and anxious to engage in meaningful negotiations with Greece, however it 
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was Greece who had persistently failed and refused to do so. In addition, Greece had 
refused to consider the Turkish proposal for joint exploration as well96. Turkey also 
stated that Greece had been carrying out research activities in the area since 1963 
whereas Turkey engaged in similar activities only since 1974, underlining that the Greek 
research ship Nautilus was doing research in the Eastern Aegean outside Greek 
territorial waters at the time of the pleadings.  Moreover, Turkey put forward that Greece 
had not been even willing to agree on a definition of the Aegean Sea for the purpose of 
meaningful negotiations, with an intention of isolating the continental shelf areas 
relating other than the islands in the Aegean.  
 
The Turkish government argued that the Court lacked prima facia jurisdiction for two 
reasons. Firstly, Greece was not entitled to rely upon any valid agreement between the 
two states. The General Act of 1928 was no longer in force and in no time during the 
governmental talks had there been any mention of the General Act97. As for the Joint 
Communiqué, it stated “these should be settled pacifically by negotiations and 
concerning the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea by the ICJ”. This could not be 
interpreted as amounting to one state unilaterally applying to the Court. Moreover, the 
subject matter appears to be the whole of the Aegean, contrary to the Greek application 
that was limited to the said islands98.  
 
Secondly, Turkey argued that, even in the event of the General Act being in force 
applicable, it would be subject to a reservation that would exclude the Court’s 
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jurisdiction. The reservation made by Greece excluded the disputes relating to the 
territorial status of Greece from the procedures described in the General Act. In 
conformity with Article 39/3 of the General Act, which stated: “If one of the parties to a 
dispute has made a reservation, the other parties may enforce the same reservation in 
regard to the party”, Turkey opposed this reservation to the Greek application99.  
 
On 19 December 1978, the court delivered its judgment; by 12 votes to 2, it had found 
that it did not possess the jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the 
Government of Greece100.  
 
The Court decided that there existed a legal dispute between Greece and Turkey in 
respect of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea101. In respect of the first basis of 
jurisdiction relied upon, Article 17 of the General Act of 1928, the court considered that 
if the applicability of the reservation was justified then the question whether the General 
Act was in force and applicable would cease to be essential for the decision regarding 
the court’s jurisdiction102. The Court viewed that, Turkey’s invocation of the reservation 
in a formal statement made in response to a communication from the Court must be 
considered as constituting an enforcement of the reservation within the meaning of 
Article 39/3 of the Act. The Court therefore took into account the reservation that had 
been properly brought to its notice in the proceedings103. In this respect, the Court 
decided that the dispute related to the territorial status of Greece within the meaning of 
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the reservation and it was effective in excluding the matter from the scope of the General 
Act. Consequently, the General Act could not be used as a valid basis for the jurisdiction 
of the Court.  
 
The second basis of jurisdiction relied upon by Greece was the Brussels Joint 
Communiqué of 31 May 1975. Contrary to the Turkish contention, the Court did found 
that the communiqué amounted to an international agreement. However, examining the 
course of negotiations of which the Brussels meeting and the subsequent text, the Court 
gave the opinion that Turkey had always intended that the two states should negotiate a 
special agreement or compromis defining their dispute, on the basis of which they could 
make a joint submission to the Court. It found that that the parties did not undertake any 
unconditional commitment to refer the continental shelf dispute to the Court104. As a 
result, the Court decided that the Brussels Joint Communiqué did not constitute an 
immediate and unqualified commitment on the part of Greece and Turkey to accept the 
submission of the dispute to the Court unilaterally by application and therefore there 
were no valid basis for establishing the Court’s jurisdiction105.  
 
 
4.4 From Agreement to Crisis (1976-1987) 
 
Soon after the UN Security Council Resolution was declared and the Greek request for 
interim measures was declined, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two Aegean 
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states once again met in New York on 1 October 1976. The Joint Communiqué issued at 
the end of the meeting envisaged that talks on the Aegean disputes of continental shelf 
and air space would be resumed in order to reach a mutually acceptable settlement. In 
this respect, the representatives of both states met in Bern on 2-11 November 1976106.  
 
The Bern Agreement was signed at the last day of the meeting, setting out the 
fundamental grounds for the Aegean continental shelf delimitation. Within this context, 
the two parties agreed that “the negotiation shall be frank, thoroughgoing and pursued in 
good faith, with a view to reaching an agreement based on their mutual consent with 
regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf as between themselves”107. Moreover, 
the agreement urged Greece and Turkey in Article 6 “to refrain from initiative or act 
concerning the Aegean Continental Shelf that might trouble the negotiations”. It was 
also agreed for the establishment of a mixed commission to be set up, composed of 
national representatives in order to study the practices and the international rules on the 
subject so as to make use of these principles in the delimitation of the continental shelf 
between Greece and Turkey108. 
 
Following the Bern Agreement, Greece and Turkey engaged in a process of 
negotiations, both at a technical and political level. Until October 1981, five expert 
meetings were held on the matter, as well as eleven meetings at the level of the Secretary 
Generals of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, with the newly formed 
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socialist government in Greece, the process was interrupted leading to the end of 
dialogue between Greece and Turkey on the issue of continental shelf109. 
 
Under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou, the new Greek government of PASOK 
was formed in October 1981. Right after coming to power, the government granted a 
petroleum exploration license to North Aegean Petroleum Company (NAPC). The 
license covered the offshore oil field near the Northern Aegean Greek island of 
Thassos110.  
 
The Turkish government immediately responded, reminding the Greek government its 
obligations under the Bern Agreement not to conduct such exploration activities. The 
Greek government assured that it would abide by the agreement and appealed to the 
force majeur provision of the concession agreement so as to put an end to the 
exploration activities. Turkey correspondingly made similar protests addressed to the 
Greek Government’s concessions to Greek Public Petroleum Company in 1984, which 
covered the areas beyond the Greek territorial sea in Strimonicos and Thermaicos bays.  
The Greek government assuring Turkey to comply with the terms of the Bern 
Agreement, pointed out that the mentioned localities could sometimes stretch beyond the 
territorial sea because of technicalities111.  
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The issue, which had so far been handled peacefully between Greece and Turkey, 
nevertheless became troublesome in October 1985. On 3 October, the Greek government 
all of a sudden lifted the force majeur provision it had invoked in 1982 and declared that 
the Greek Public Petroleum Company would associate in petroleum activities in the 
areas east of Thassos. This decision was accompanied by the Greek Prime Minister 
Andreas Papandreou’s denunciation of the 1976 Bern Agreement, which meant that it no 
longer recognized the agreement and consequently would not consider itself bound by 
its terms112.  
 
These sudden developments directly led to frustration and tension between the two 
states. Turkey made it clear that it would not recognize the unilateral denouncement of 
Greece from its obligations under the agreement. The matter was further tightened when 
on 24 February 1987 the NAPC announced that it would drill for oil, 10 nautical miles 
east of Thassos the following month. Regardless of the Turkish objections and protests, 
the Greek government confirmed the planned drilling activity113.  
 
As a counter-action, Turkey initiated procedures to grant petroleum licenses to TPAO in 
the Aegean and the Turkish vessel “Piri Reis” started to conduct scientific research in 
the high seas areas of the Aegean in March 1987. The Greek response came quick; the 
Turkish vessel was harassed by Greek military aircraft over the Aegean. Following the 
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publication of the new licenses in the Turkish Official Gazette, MTA Sismik-I sailed 
towards the Aegean for seismic research as well114. 
 
Meanwhile, Turkey brought the matter to the attention of the United Nations Secretary 
General, pointing out to the grave situation created by the Greek actions, with a letter 
from the Turkish Ambassador to the United Nations on 23 March 1987115. The letter 
emphasized that the ongoing negotiation process since 1976 was disrupted by the Greek 
government and acted contrary to the terms of both the Bern Agreement and the UN 
Security Council Resolution 395 of 1976. Moreover, Turkey noted that the Greek 
government had considered the Bern Agreement to be inoperative because of the lack of 
negotiations; whereas it was Greece who had terminated the negotiations and acted 
totally different than the terms of the agreement, not refraining from engaging into 
exploration activities and deliberately causing to an aggravation of tension between their 
bilateral relations.  The Turkish government also asserted that it does not intend to 
acquiescence to any unilateral Greek action with regard to the Aegean continental shelf. 
In view of the prevailing situation, Turkey argued that Greece should refrain from all 
activities beyond its territorial waters on the Aegean continental shelf and should agree 
to resume negotiations in the context of the Bern Agreement.  
 
As it became apparent that Greece was determined to go on with this attitude; Turkey 
announced that it would proceed with conducting seismic research activities in the high 
sea of the Aegean, unless Greece refrained to do so. However, in addition to this, the 
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Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal stated on 27 March 1987 that in the course of this 
seismic activity, Turkey would not go beyond its territorial waters, if Greece similarly 
would refrain from drilling beyond its own territorial waters116.  
 
The crisis was only defused as a result of this firm and conciliatory stand accompanied 
by the involvement of the Secretary General of NATO and the USA, Greece eventually 
withdraw from its planned drilling activities. In the aftermath of the crisis, a process of 
dialogue was established: the Davos Process117. However, the Aegean continental shelf 
issue could not be dealt with properly in the process, because Greece insisted on 
referring the case to the ICJ as the only way to settle the dispute. Since then the issue 
remains unsolved. The two Aegean states comply with the terms of the Bern Agreement 
at the moment, not engaging into any actions beyond their respective territorial seas; but 
on the other hand, no efforts are made to go one step further on the matter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
LEGAL CLAIMS OF GREECE AND TURKEY 
 
 
With respect to the delimitation of the continental shelf, the Greek and the Turkish 
authorities diverge in several matters, leading the matter into a deadlock. For about 18 
years no progress is made on the dispute, since neither of them is even willing to 
compromise on the nature of the dispute. They disagree on the area of waters to be 
claimed as continental shelf; on the legal rules to be applied and on the approach for a 
legal settlement. The two states put forward conflicting arguments although both suggest 
the application of international law at the same time. The security considerations are also 
a predominant element in their approaches to the problem.  
 
5.1 The Greek Point of View 
 
The Greek government is, first of all, critical of the Turkish attitude in solving the 
delimitation problem, as it tends to politicize the issue instead of a solution acclaimed by 
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international law. Greece on the other hand, is determined to solve the matter in 
compliance with international law, since the issue itself possesses a legal character. In 
line with this position, Greece’s legal claims are categorized under three major headings: 
the right of islands to their own continental shelf; to preserve the integrity of its 
territories to encompass the islands and the principle of the median line118.  
 
First and foremost, Greece seems uncomfortable about the Turkish approach to the 
problem. Turkey argues that the delimitation of the continental shelf areas between 
Greece and Turkey concerns the partition of the entire Aegean and insists that it should 
acquire those areas that fall west of the Greek islands up to the middle of the Aegean 
Sea. This understanding of delimitation falls far from having a legal character, making 
the issue one of a political. Greece maintains that, without any reference to international 
law and practice, Turkey tries to realize its aspirations in the Aegean Sea with ill-
grounded propositions. 
 
Greece on the other hand, stresses that the matter to be settled concerns the areas that fall 
east of the Eastern Greek Islands; from the Thracian border to the islands of the 
Northern and Eastern Aegean and the Dodecanese. Turkey, by invoking the “equity”119 
principle to the contrary, has no sufficient grounds to include the whole of the Aegean to 
the concerned matter. Turkey does not interpret this principle in accordance with 
international law, but gives an arbitrary interpretation to the notion. It chooses this 
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criterion with a deliberate political outlook in order to further expansionist moves 
towards the Aegean, without any reference to international law120.  
 
With a pure legal stance, firstly, Greece states that all Greek islands, including the 
Eastern Aegean islands belonging to it, have a right to claim continental shelf. There is 
no reason for these territories should be denied the legal right just as mainland Greece 
has. This is in total conformity with international treaty and customary law, mentioned 
openly in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf Article 1(b). “Greece 
notes that, it is necessary to respect rights acquired under the existing international 
Conventions, especially those adopted under the auspices of the UN”121. 
 
Nevertheless, Turkey does not recognize that islands are entitled to continental shelf; 
instead, it intends to carve a line right in the middle of the Aegean, partitioning the 
whole sea as if there were no islands. Under international law, Greece has full rights of 
continental shelf for its islands in the Aegean, backed up by two major international 
conventions on the law of the sea and the 1969 decision of the ICJ regarding the 
delimitation of the continental shelf in the North Sea, where islands are entitled to their 
own continental shelf122. Greece also argues that this rule is not only a conventional, but 
also a customary rule of international law; it should accordingly bind Turkey although it 
was not a party to the Convention123. 
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Turkey’s claim that the Aegean islands demonstrate a special case and therefore should 
enjoy fewer rights is thus ill-founded in international law. It makes no sense for the 
Greek islands to be deprived of their continental shelf right whereas other islands 
possess this specific legal right. “As geographical diversity is inevitable and the primary 
aim of every system of law is to have a general and uniform application, these islands 
should have the right as others”124. The Turkish irrationality is more obviously seen 
when the number of Greek islands about 3000 and the continuous chain it forms starting 
from mainland Greece is taken into consideration. It is impossible to ignore the 
existence of these islands as well as their continental shelf areas125.  
 
Secondly, Greece is very much concerned over its security and political position in the 
Aegean. It is important to bear in mind that Greece and Turkey has come to the brink of 
war several times during the century, Turkey being considerably hostile in several 
disagreements or misunderstandings in the Aegean. From the Greek perspective, Turkey 
initiated its aggressive attitude by questioning the control and command arrangements of 
NATO concerning the Aegean; unilaterally declared half of the Aegean continental shelf 
under its jurisdiction, invaded Cyprus in 1974 and threatened Greece of war in the 
summer 1996 by questioning Greek territorial sovereignty over a number of islets126. All 
serve as examples of the danger and the volatile relations between the two neighboring 
states.  
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As for maritime delimitation, when looked from the Greek perspective, Turkey 
endangers Greece’s political and territorial integrity by its continental shelf policy, by 
intending to divide Greek sovereign territories.  It is important to note that Greece is a 
country composed of several islands as well as a mainland. In this respect, Greece 
believes that a foreign sea should not divide the state’s political and territorial integrity. 
This statement is also backed by customary law as well as the UN Charter127. As Turkey 
claims part of the Aegean Sea to be its own continental shelf, this situation will in turn 
divide Greek territory and political integrity.  
 
Not only Turkey would divide Greek territory in the Aegean with its ill-founded policy 
towards Greece, it will directly threaten the security of the Greek Aegean islands by 
enclaving them with Turkish continental shelf area. The Turkish policy in the Aegean is 
more than mere maritime delimitation; it aims to entrap these islands by surrounding 
them with Turkish maintenance in the Eastern Aegean. This poses a significant security 
problem with regard to these islands whose connection with mainland Greece would be 
deliberately interrupted by the Turkish government128.  
 
With respect to these important perspectives of the Greek government, there appears 
only one solution in delimiting the continental shelf areas in the Aegean Sea. The best 
solution for delimitation is the median line of equidistance129. The concerned maritime 
area should be divided in accordance with the median line principle, where the 
                                                 
127
 UN Charter Article 2(4) says “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 
95
 H. Pazarcı Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri, (Ankara: Turhan, 2003), pp. 376-379.  
129
 UNCLOS, Vol.1, p.128. 
 62 
separating line would pass between the Greek Islands, which are found at the outmost 
East, and mainland Turkey. Greece justifies this solution with the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf Article 6(1), where a median line is provided in the 
absence of an agreement between opposite states that delimits the continental shelf area. 
As there is no agreement with Turkey regarding the continental shelf areas, the median 
line itself is set out as the last resort to the delimitation problem that exists between the 
two Aegean states130.  
 
It is also important here to note that, in the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
Greece constantly argued that there should be one solid rule to be applied in this case. 
“The less room it left for bilateral agreement, the better it would protect the international 
legal order”131. Greece maintained that unambiguous rules of law are the best means for 
the protection of the rights, as equitable principles are vague and dangerous as it will 
open the door to conflicting interpretations132. 
 
More importantly, the median line solution complies with international law; it 
recognizes the right of islands to continental shelf and implements the principle of 
median line provided in international treaty law. In addition, it serves in favor of Greek 
security interests in the region, preserving its political and territorial integrity with 
regard to any possible harassment from the Turkish side.  
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Greece claims that, because of years of disagreement and Turkish tendency to drag the 
issue out of norms of international law together with politicizing the issue, it finds the 
only solution as referring the case to the ICJ. Greece also mentioned during the 
Conference that compulsory jurisdiction for the peaceful settlement of disputes is 
necessary and that “unilateral recourse to a Court is the only way out”133. Nevertheless, 
Turkey refuses to stand in Court and the dispute is therefore stuck in a deadlock.  
 
 
5.2 Turkish Point of View 
 
Turkey is persistent on arguing for a delimitation in the Aegean that concerns the whole 
of the semi-enclosed sea. Contrary to Greek propositions, Turkey in its part has legal 
justifications of its own, again arguing for a settlement in accordance with international 
law. It is important here to note that, Turkey is not a party to the 1958 Geneva 
Convention as well as to the 1982 Convention, although Greece is a party to both. As a 
result the dispute needs to be dealt within the context of customary international law.  
 
Together with rules of international customary law, the Turkish position is also inspired 
by the jurisprudence of the ICJ, particularly the 1969 judgment of the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Case134. In this context, Turkey puts forward four important 
justifications for its policy in the Aegean Sea: (1) the need for an agreement for 
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delimitation; (2) the significance of natural prolongation; (3) the principle of equity and 
(4) the legal and political balance to be preserved in the Aegean135.  
 
Firstly, Turkey argues for an agreement to be reached between the two Aegean states 
with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf. Also being mentioned in the two 
major conventions on the law of the sea, the first attribution for a settlement is affected 
by an agreement. The history of relations between states showed that the most common 
means of settling international disputes was negotiations, particularly meaningful 
negotiations, and that it had been recognized by the ICJ in the judgment concerning the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Case136. 
 
Regardless of customary law, Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea 
and Articles 74-83 of the 1982 Convention attach considerable emphasis on the 
agreement of parties in formulating rules on delimitation of the seabed or maritime 
areas137. As also stated in the Jan Mayen Case of 1993, the delimitation of the 
continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts, is to be affected “by 
agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of 
the ICJ, in order to achieve an equitable solution.138” This perspective is in line with 
Turkish policy in the Aegean, where Turkish policy makers always sought to achieve an 
agreement with its Greek counterparts on several meetings, including ministerial level 
ones.  
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Despite the fact that Turkey is in favor of an agreement, it does not totally reject the 
possibility of submission of the dispute to the ICJ139. Nevertheless, Greek rejection of an 
agreement, even a prior “special agreement” to set out the fundamental concerns of the 
dispute and its persistence of referring the issue directly to the Court, prevents any 
improvement on the matter. Although the problem can be dealt bilaterally between 
Greece and Turkey, the fact that Greece insists on internationalizing the issue is totally 
unconstructive towards solving the discord. 
 
Secondly, Turkey asserts that the continental shelf areas are defined primarily by the 
natural prolongation of the land territory into and under the sea. Consequently, each 
country should be entitled to a continental shelf based on the prolonged land territory 
towards the sea. Since the notion of the continental shelf was essentially a 
geomorphological one, the criterion should be natural prolongation140.  
 
 The seabed of the Aegean is interrupted by a major depression running down the middle 
of the Aegean and this feature constitutes a natural boundary between the natural 
prolongations of mainlands Greece and Turkey. Therefore the Greek islands that face the 
Turkish coast geologically reside in the natural prolongation of the Anatolian land mass 
and for this reason they do not possess a continental shelf of their own141. This position 
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is also justified by the ICJ’s judgment on of the North Sea Continental Shelf Case in 
1969142. As a result, the Greek claim that every island possesses its own continental 
shelf does not fit within the broader legal definition of the continental shelf, because of 
the Turkish natural prolongation that forms the Greek islands.  
 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the Aegean case deserves special emphasis to the 
principle of equity. Turkey has always defended that equitable principles are “the 
hallmark of the entire method of delimitation143. The delimitation of the continental shelf 
areas are affected by those principles and rules applicable which are appropriate to bring 
about an equitable result, as stated in the Tunisia/Libya case of 1982144.  
 
There are two significant justifications that Turkey resorts to in this respect.  Further to 
the legal fact that the existence of islands creates a special circumstance to be taken into 
account in maritime delimitation, the configuration of the Aegean Sea creates an 
additional unique character regarding the Greek islands with their location, number, size 
and population. In the course of negotiations, special circumstances such as the general 
configuration of the respective coasts, the existence of islands, islets and rocks of one 
state on the continental shelf of the other needs to be considered145.  Although small in 
number of Greek islands of various sizes lie in close proximity to the coast of Turkey, 
covering nearly %85 of the long Turkish coastline. Turkey’s almost all coasts to the 
                                                 
142
 UNCLOS Vol.2, p.158. The judgment of the North Sea Continental Shelf Case was concluded with 
respect to the natural prolongations of the parties. It also disregarded the equidistance principle, because 
the natural prolongation of the continental shelf of Germany extended beyond the equidistant line between 
Germany and Denmark.  
143
 UNCLOS Vol.2, p.158. 
144
 The Tunisia /Libya Case, ICJ Reports, 1982, Para. 50. 
145
 UNCLOS Vol.3, p.201. 
 67 
Aegean Sea is already encircled by the Greek islands and their adjacent territorial seas. 
In addition, the Aegean Sea is a semi-enclosed sea, which makes the maritime 
delimitation to be determined jointly by the coastal states146. States bordering enclosed 
and semi-enclosed seas may hold consultations among themselves with a view to 
determining the manners and method of application, appropriate for their rights147. In 
light of these characteristics, delimitation between Greece and Turkey has to be done in 
line with equitable principles.  
 
In this respect, to begin with, Greece needs to acknowledge that the existence of islands 
and the semi-enclosed structure of the Aegean Sea create a special circumstance, and 
then agree to delimit the continental shelf with reference to equitable principles that is 
fair to both sides.  Actually, all these Turkish propositions are not new; they are drawn 
from rules and general principles of international law which are confirmed by case 
law148. 
 
Lastly, Turkey argues that a delimitation of continental shelf in the Aegean needs to take 
into account a special consideration, which is partially legal and partially political. The 
political and legal balance established by the Lausanne Treaty ought to be preserved. 
Turkey stresses that the Lausanne Treaty has established a balance between Greece and 
Turkey in the Aegean Sea and both states should benefit from the Aegean in equal 
terms149.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
LAW OF THE SEA IN RESPECT OF THE AEGEAN CASE 
 
 
The Aegean Sea continental shelf case is a unique one among similar maritime 
delimitation cases; as far as the individual claims point out, both states want a solution 
that would be in accordance with international law. So does their justifications for the 
delimitation. One argues for a delimitation that relates the whole Aegean whereas the 
other draws the line in the East; however both justify their claims legally. This situation 
stems from the selection of sources of international law, interpretation of the law and 
involving politics in the issue.  
 
In order to have a comprehensive look to the dispute of continental shelf between 
Greece and Turkey, firstly the concerned geography needs to be defined and then the 
applicable law should be decided on. As Turkey is not a party to the 1958 and 1982 
Conventions, the matter has to be solved in the light of customary international law. Of 
course the willingness to solve the matter is another must to have a compromise. The 
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issue needs to be dealt in legal terms; the role of politics in the Aegean should be 
minimized so as to reach a fair solution that would be in the interest of both states150.  
 
 
6.1 Geographical Dictation  
 
By definition, the geographical area that the continental shelf is aimed to be delimited 
concerns the seabed areas of the Aegean Sea which are beyond the 6 nautical miles 
territorial sea limits of Greece and Turkey. However, this precision is insufficient for the 
matter to be confined into. Greek perception of the area of the dispute is limited to the 
continental shelf areas that fall east of the Eastern Aegean Islands next to the Turkish 
coast, as it presented the issue to the ICJ in 1976. Turkey on the other hand, argues for a 
settlement that would draw up a boundary for continental shelf areas that would pass 
right at the middle of the Aegean Sea.  
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6.1.1 North-South Depression 
 
For the area of delimitation to be identified, geographical and geological characteristics 
of the Aegean Sea gain considerable importance. While Greece argues that all islands 
including the Eastern Aegean islands have their continental shelf of their own, Turkey 
insists that these islands fall in the natural prolongation of Turkish mainland. In this 
respect, the situation of the islands gains outmost importance.  
 
Turkish argument is based on pure geological statements; that the seabed of the Aegean 
Sea is interrupted by a major depression running down the middle of the Aegean in a 
general North-South direction151. This is derived from the research made on the ocean 
crust; the bottom of the depression displaying different characteristics at different places. 
This geomorphologic reality brings us to an important fact that the whole of the Aegean 
can not be regarded as the natural prolongation of any state, but actually there is a 
maritime boundary line between the natural prolongations of the Greek mainland and the 
Turkish mainland. Consequently, the Eastern Aegean islands are situated at the eastern 
side of this natural frontier and sit on the seabed that is the natural prolongation of the 
Turkish land mass extending into and under the sea. It would not be wrong to say that 
the maritime space between these Greek islands in the Eastern Aegean and the Turkish 
mainland is like a flooded part of the Turkish land. Geologically too, a clear similarity is 
observed between the seabed east of the major depression and the Turkish land 
territory152.  
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In this connection, Turkey argues that the delimitation of the continental shelf areas in 
the Aegean ought to reflect this geological fact. So long as the natural prolongation of 
the Turkish mainland extend up to the middle of the Aegean and by definition 
continental shelf are those areas that are composed of the natural prolongation of the 
coast, there is no point in limiting the issue to the narrow belt between the Greek islands 
in the eastern Aegean and the Turkish coast153.  
 
The Turkish view is also supported by some of the ICJ judgments. When the dispute 
arose in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey, the Court had accepted the view that 
geophysical feature would serve as a legal delimitation line in cases where there are no 
other natural features to divide the distinct shelves. In other words, when the 
delimitation area between two coastal states is divided by a natural feature, then it will 
be considered as the formal line that would divide the natural prolongations of the two 
different states. This was the case in several judgments of the ICJ such as the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases of 1969 154 In addition; two other disputes were settled with this 
approach, between Australia and Indonesia, and between Japan and Korea155.  
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For this reason, the major depression right in the middle of the Aegean Sea that stretch 
in a general North-South direction is of outmost importance in determining the boundary 
between the natural prolongations of Greece and Turkey.  
 
From a different perspective, it can be argued that the Court seemed to change its view 
after the Libya/Malta Case in 1985 where it concluded on a change of this thinking, that 
a state may claim up to a 200 mile limit whatever the geological characteristics may say 
about the corresponding seabed and subsoil156. However, it is important to note that the 
Court in this specific case has decided concerning the exclusive economic zone, whereas 
the regimes of continental shelf and exclusive economic zones are somewhat 
different157. Moreover, the new rule will not deprive a state of its rights under the 
previous law, without its consent. It will not be opposable to states that have been 
persistently objecting such an application, bearing in mind the “persistent objector” 
principle of international law158. In this case, Turkey is known to be the objector, with 
strong persistence on the application of the principle of natural prolongation. It is also 
crucial here to point that this new application of 200 mile limit without taking into 
account the natural prolongation is not pursued by the following cases159.  
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Thus, the depression that naturally divides the Aegean into two is considered as a legal 
delimitation line between the continental shelf areas of Greece and Turkey. Regarding 
this fact alone, the Greek argument of the delimitation area to be refined to the eastern 
side of the Eastern Aegean Islands is easily refutable, since Turkish mainland’s 
prolongation naturally reaches to the middle of the Aegean anyway. More strikingly, the 
question of whether these islands have a continental shelf of their own inherently 
weakens the Greek views, as they reside on the Turkish natural prolongation at the first 
place.   
 
 
6.1.2 Right of Islands to Their Own Continental Shelf 
 
The heart of the delimitation issue in fact lies at the different views over the continental 
shelf rights of the Eastern Aegean Islands. It is crucial to initially identify whether these 
Greek islands have the capacity to generate continental shelf areas of their own, over the 
seabed of the Turkish natural prolongation.  
 
It is important to note that islands, especially those close to another state are considered 
as special circumstances. Firstly, an island as small as 1 km2 could rule over an area of 
190 times bigger than it is, if it is allowed to have a contiguous zone of 24 nautical 
miles160. In such a case we can not speak of a fair distribution of maritime areas, if this 
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island is depriving another state from rights over this area161. The direct application of 
international law thus does not necessarily mean an equitable solution. 
 
Moreover, when an island is situated very close to the coasts of another state, it would 
deprive the latter altogether from its rights on the seabed. In this case, it can be argued 
that the island would have more right for continental shelf than the mainland of the 
coastal state. Even if an island is not situated that close to another state, but stands right 
in between two opposite states, the equidistant method would give the three-fourths of 
the maritime areas to the state that the island belongs to. A significant point is that, 
islands can not prevail over the considerations that are related to the mainlands162. These 
circumstances are clear examples of what makes such islands a special case and explains 
why the Eastern Aegean islands should be regarded in this context163. It should be kept 
in mind that “…special circumstances are those circumstances which might modify the 
result produced by an unqualified application of the equidistance principle.”164 
 
In light of these, both Greek and Turkish arguments should be analyzed. Greece asserts 
that the Eastern Aegean islands are entitled to continental shelf just as any other island 
would have, pointing to the 1958 Geneva Convention Article 1(b) and 1982 Convention 
Articles 76 and 121 in defense. In legal terms, these two articles can not be imposed on 
Turkey, as it could be done to another state, because it is not a party to both of these 
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conventions and there they have no binding character upon Turkey. In this respect, we 
need to ask the question whether these two articles have become part of customary law.  
 
At the Geneva Conference of 1958, the rule did not gain wide support; 35 states 
remained non-committed whereas only 31 states voted for its inclusion. Therefore, it 
was inherently hard to expect this article to develop as customary law165. It was referred 
by the ICJ, for the first three articles of the Geneva Convention as customary law in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases; nevertheless this revealed the acceptance of the 
continental shelf as a general concept, not including the whole of the article166. In other 
words, not every provision of the Convention was accepted as customary law; the 
fundamental example would be the reference to technology, which no one has ever 
referred to as having the character of customary international law167. In the Seabed 
Committee, established right after the Geneva Convention had come into force, several 
states challenged the capacity of all islands to generate submarine areas as well as 
contesting the definition of continental shelf itself168.  
 
In the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which gave way to the 
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, a significant number of states including Turkey 
opposed to the concept of all islands having a submarine area, stating that all islands can 
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not be treated the same way.169. Even after the definition of continental shelf in the 
Geneva Convention was changed and Articles 76 and 121 were adopted in 1982, this 
opposition went on. Article 121 was in fact adopted in a very unusual manner; it was 
accepted without detailed treatment because of lack of time. Thus, the Article does not 
have a character reflecting the general view of states over the rights of islands to 
continental shelf. Not only this was the case during the Conference, there is no hint that 
it is accepted even after the Conference170.  
 
As a result, these articles and thus the statement that all islands are entitled to submarine 
areas are not opposable against a state, namely Turkey, which is not party to these 
Conventions and opposed to the drafting of and the principles within the provision. 
Therefore the Greek argument that the Eastern Aegean Islands have a continental shelf 
of their own, will not find support in legal terms, as the rule is not a part of customary 
international law.  
 
Regardless of their non-existent customary law character, the articles of the 1958 
Convention actually give no indication of an amount of continental shelf area in a 
delimitation setting. Even if the general principles of the continental shelf had passed 
into customary international law, the rule on entitlement should not be confused with the 
rule on delimitation. Lacking any help when delimitation is the issue, Article 1 only 
mentions the islands’ right to continental shelf. It is article 6 of the 1958 Convention that 
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defines the procedures to be followed in the delimitation of the continental shelf. Article 
6 states that where special circumstances exist, the equidistant line is not acceptable. As 
islands in a delimitation area constitute a special circumstance, the right of an island to 
have an area of continental shelf of its own depends on the islands’ size, locality, 
population and political status171.  One good example is found in the Channel Islands 
Case, where the Arbitral Court decided in the enclavement of the islands that belonged 
the U.K., because they were situated much closer to the French coast. Similarly, in the 
Tunisia/Libya Case, the Court gave only partial effect to those islands that were 
proximate to another state’s coast on the grounds that “there were other considerations 
which prevail over the effect of its presence. In the Gulf of Maine Case, the Court gave 
actually no effect to the concerned island in delimitation172.   
 
As a result, capacity and effect should be distinguished; Article 121 concerns the 
abstract generative capacity of islands, not the concrete effect that the islands would be 
given in delimitation. This delimitation would be determined on the basis of the general 
rules of equitable principles and an equitable result173.  
 
In sum, islands can not be considered as sufficient unites for the purpose of delimitation, 
with regards to contrary claims of mainlands. The rule on the definition and scope of the 
continental shelf areas should not be confused with that of the delimitation of the area 
between two states. Not every island is given the same effect when delimitation is the 
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case. Not only islands constitute a special circumstance by their own, their close 
proximity to another state’s coast serves as an important ingredient in terms of 
delimiting continental shelf areas. 
 
 
6.1.3 Semi-Enclosed Nature of the Aegean Sea 
 
Another significant point to be taken into account in the delimitation of the Aegean Sea 
continental shelf case concerns the geographical outlook of the Aegean Sea. This fact 
too affects the settlement in the Aegean, as the coasts of the Greek and Turkish 
territories face each other, creating another special circumstance. This characteristic 
deprives the case from being regarded as an ordinary one and the application of the 
equidistant line.  
 
In the Libya/Malta Case of 1985, although no specific circumstance existed that affected 
only by their coats being opposite to each other, the Court had concluded that the 
equidistant line was not applicable, due to the Mediterranean Sea being a semi-enclosed 
one and the Maltese island constituting a limited coastal area with a small significance 
within the geographical whole of the Mediterranean Sea. The decision was against the 
Maltese, giving only one-fourth of the concerned area to her, whereas an equidistant line 
would give the half to the island. Even the fact that Malta was an independent island 
state was not influential in the Court’s decision. In fact, the Court stated that, had Malta 
not been an independent state, but an island forming a part of an independent state, the 
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delimitation of the continental shelf would be different, giving even less submarine areas 
to the island, with a delimitation line closer to Malta, in order to create equity174.   
 
When applied to the Aegean context, the Aegean Sea is not only a semi-enclosed sea 
that necessitates a solution more than an ordinary application of the legal rules, but it is 
much smaller with regards to the Mediterranean, where states would be more affected  
directly by the outcome of a maritime delimitation. In this context, it can be concluded 
that delimitations in a semi-enclosed sea involve more than the treatment of individual 
geographical features; the overall geographical context determines the extent of an 
island’s continental shelf175. 
 
 
6.2 Principle of Equity and Fairness 
 
The reason for international legal rules to be applied differently in different cases stems 
from the fact that every case has a unique character that dictates particular solutions, 
when relevant inputs are taken into consideration. In practical terms, what matters in the 
continental shelf delimitation is that whether the result of delimitation in the context of 
the Aegean Sea would be equitable, if Greek islands were to be given the same weight as 
much as the mainland coast of Turkey. Thus, the crux of the matter relies on the 
                                                 
174
 Libya/Malta Case, ICJ Reports, 1985, para. 53. The Court maintained in its judgment that “Malta being 
independent, the relationship of its coats with the coasts of its neighbors is different from what it would be 
if it were a part of the territory of one of them. In other words, it might well be that the sea boundaries in 
this region would be different if the islands of Malta did not constitute an independent state, but formed a 
part of the territory of one of the surrounding countries.” 
175
 Donald C. Karl. The Delimitation of the Aegean Continental Shelf; Equitable principles and the 
Problem of Islands in the Aegean Issues, Problems and Prospects, (Foreign Policy Institute: 1989), pp. 
155,158. 
 80 
equitable solution between states, not on the pure application of what international treaty 
law dictates.  
 
The principle of equity and fairness has long been considered as a source of international 
law, as a part of the general principles of law. Often been applied by international 
tribunals, the principle appears to be within the ambit of Article 38/1(c) of the Statute of 
the ICJ. The most prominent use of equity has been in the law of the sea, in the context 
of the delimitation of maritime zones between opposite and adjacent states176. The 
essential point is that the principle of equity is a source of international law in the sense 
that it may influence the manner in which more substantive rules are applied. It is a 
“form of equity which constitutes a method of interpretation of the law in force, and is 
one of its attributes.”177 The ICJ has emphasized that equity is not an abstract concept, 
but the application of rules of international law with due regard to fairness and 
reasonableness.  
 
In this regard, the settlement between Greece and Turkey needs to be handled from the 
perspective of equitable principles, considering the special characteristics of the Aegean 
Sea. The location, number and size of the islands, the coastal relationship of Greece and 
Turkey within them; the geological characteristics and length of the seabed underneath, 
and a reasonable degree of proportionality need to be taken into account in delimitation. 
This unique character of the Aegean indicates the uncontestable application of equitable 
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principles for the fair and equitable delimitation of continental shelf, in favor of both 
states.  
 
 
6.2.1 Non-Encroachment  
 
First of all, the non-encroachment principle must be applied in the delimitation of 
continental shelf. It is actually a root concept in the jurisprudence as a fundamental 
principle governing delimitation. This principle was developed by the ICJ in its North 
Sea Continental Shelf Cases judgment in 1969, with a view to demonstrate that the 
equidistance method is not inherent in the regime of the continental shelf. The Court 
ruled as follows: 
“…the use of equidistance method would frequently cause areas which are the 
natural prolongation or extension of the territory of one State to be attributed to 
another, where the configuration of the latter’s coast makes the equidistance line 
swing out laterally across the former’s coastal front, cutting if off from areas 
situated directly before that front.”178  
 
In short, this statement refers to the fact that the delimitation must respect the areas that 
represent the natural or most natural prolongation of the territory of each state179. The 
importance of the configuration of coast is also underlined by the Court, emphasizing 
the particular geographical situation being an equitable solution by stating that “a State’s 
continental shelf, being the natural prolongation of its territory, must in large measure 
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reflect the configuration of its coasts.”180 Therefore, the coastal projection into the sea 
lies at the heart of the concept of the delimitation process.  
 
The reason for the natural prolongation to be given a considerable weight is to avoid the 
dangers of cut-off effects. The Court establishes that each state should receive those 
areas of the seabed where its interests protected under the continental shelf regime are 
strongest in comparison181.  In other words, the security interests of a coastal state off its 
coasts are also taken into consideration by the system established by the continental 
shelf regime. By ensuring that the shelf of one state would not cut-off the other from 
areas directly before or in front of its coastline, the requirement of the non-encroachment 
principle is satisfied. The logic of the principle can be thought as each state receiving 
those areas where its security interests are the stronger.  
 
The non-encroachment principle is also underlined in the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Case, 
where the Arbitral Tribunal noted that “In order for any delimitation to be to be made on 
an equitable and objective basis, it is necessary to ensure that as far as possible, each 
state controls the maritime territories opposite its coasts and their vicinity.182” The 
Tribunal pointed out that the application of this principle would satisfy the concerns for 
security183.  
 
                                                 
180
 ICJ Reports, 1985, para.s 100, 246. 
181
 ICJ Reports 1969, para. 43. 
182
 ICJ Reports, Maritime Delimitation between Guinea-Guinea Bissau, 1985, para. 92. 
183
 ICJ Reports. 1985, para. 124.  
 83 
In order to satisfy this principle, the ICJ proposes the median line principle in 
delimitation issues where the prolongations of opposite states meet and overlap. It states 
that the delimitation could only be done by “…ignoring the presence of islets, rocks and 
minor coastal projections the disproportionality distorting effect of which can be 
eliminated by other means, such a line must effect an equal division of the particular 
area involved.”184 In line with this view, in its decision in 1977, the Arbitral Court found 
that the delimitation based on a median line between the mainland coasts of France and 
United Kingdom, ignoring the existence of the Channel Islands under the sovereignty of 
Britain, would be an equitable solution leaving broadly equal areas to each state. The 
Court added that, had the islands were added into calculation and treated in the same 
way as mainland England, this approach would completely undermine an equitable 
solution185. Under customary law, the method used for delimitation must ensure equity.  
 
When applied to the to the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, the non-encroachment 
principle thus leads us to the solution that the delimitation of continental shelf in the 
Aegean Sea would consist of a median line between the natural prolongations of Greek 
and Turkish mainlands. Consequently, the median line would pass right in the middle of 
the Aegean Sea, without reference to the islands. In any account, the existence of the 
Turkish continental shelf in the Aegean would not cut the maritime connection of the 
Greek islands to the Greek mainland. It is not justified to argue that an equidistant 
delimitation line between the mainlands would threaten the security of the Greek 
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islands186. Consequently, an ultimate equitable solution would be reached, which would 
at the same time avoid cut-off effects, as well as applying the very nature of the 
continental shelf regime, by prioritizing the natural prolongation rule.  This equitable 
solution would be in the interest of both states. 
 
 
6.2.2 Enclave 
 
Another deduction from the same rule directs us to enclavement. As long as islands are 
ignored in the delimitation of continental shelf in line with the non-encroachment 
principle, the islands are subject to enclavement. The Channel Islands were provided 
with an enclave solution, where the Court of Arbitration made it clear that a small island 
in front of a long mainland coast does not block the seaward extension of the mainland 
coast187. The greater security interest of the mainland was acknowledged compared to 
the lesser important nature of the dependent island. The logic is that an island can not 
block the natural prolongation of the mainland coast behind it. The seaward extension 
thus reaches around the islands and enclaves them.  
 
This judgment provided the conceptual basis for an equitable delimitation in the form of 
an enclave. The enclavement is the only available solution in situations involving islands 
in close contiguity to a foreign coast. The case in the Aegean is a similar one, the islands 
being one of close contiguity.  In this particular case, the enclave method is the most 
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appropriate method to reach an equitable result. It fully satisfies the basic criteria 
governing the choice of method which are essential in evaluating, and responding to the 
circumstances of the unique case of the Aegean Sea188.  
 
By this way, the close proximity of the Greek islands to the Turkish coast and the fact 
that these islands lie on the “wrong side” of the median line is taken into consideration. 
It should be kept in mind that, these islands are not procedures of the continental shelf 
on which they sit. Rather, they are the products of that shelf that constitutes natural 
extension of the Turkish mainland coastline. Without question, the maritime areas west, 
north and south of these islands are not natural prolongations of their short coasts, but in 
fact they are properly and legally the natural prolongations of the mainland coast of 
Turkey.  
 
 
6.2.3 Equality of Title 
 
The “equality of title” does not necessarily mean equality of reach; it not legally 
supported that the dependent Greek islands would have an equal reach or prolongation 
with that of the primary coast of the Turkish mainland in the Aegean. The status of these 
islands off the Turkish coast should be given proper consideration. It is a fact that 
Greece is not an archipelagic state formed exclusively by islands, with no continental 
landmass. Rather, it is a continental mainland state, where the islands are anomalous 
dependent islands of a larger mainland state. Just as it was concluded in the 1985 
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judgment of the ICJ in Libya/Malta Case, islands dependent are not equal with 
mainlands in their capacity to generate rights over maritime area; rather they are 
“anomalous dependent islands of a large mainland state189. The judicial decisions and 
practice of States disclose that it is generally accepted that an island state must 
necessarily be accorded more weight than such distant fragments of mainland states; and 
that independent States should be favored over dependent territories. 190 
 
When the Greek argument is considered, equity falls into question. If the natural 
prolongations are not prioritized, the non-encroachment is disregarded, an enclave 
solution is not welcomed and the Greek islands were given full effect on the boundary, 
then this would have several inequitable outcomes ranging from political to geographical 
and legal. 
 
 Firstly, this would grant a privileged position to the dependent islands of a continental 
state in relation to their continental neighbor with a long coastline next to the area of 
delimitation. It will fall contrary to the principle that independent states should be 
favored over dependent territories. Secondly, it would disregard the geographical factors 
in the Eastern Aegean and ignore how the coasts project into the sea, where the seaward 
extension of the Turkish coast is the dominant factor. The natural prolongation of the 
Turkish landmass would thus be overlooked. Thirdly, it would assume that the 
continental landmass of the Turkish mainland is a projection of the submerged landmass 
of the Greek islands. To put it differently, the Turkish mainland would be considered as 
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sitting on the continental shelf of the Greek islands and that it is the product, rather than 
the producer of the continental shelf on which it lies. Fourthly, the Greek mainland 
would be non-existent and consequently the area of entitlement would depend solely on 
the detached Eastern Aegean islands. This would make no sense as continental part of 
Greece is the main land territory whereas the islands are dependents. Fifthly, it would 
assume that Greece is an independent insular state formed by islands without continental 
landmass and that it is entitled to archipelagic status under Article 46  of the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. This would completely deny the actual geographical 
and political status of Greece. Sixthly, it would mean that no high seas exist on the west 
of the Eastern Aegean islands, between them and the Greek mainland and between the 
islands themselves. It would regard the Aegean Sea no different than a Greek Lake.191.  
 
 
6.2.4 Proportionality of Coastal Lengths 
 
Another equitable principle to be applied in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case is 
the element of proportionality. The concept of proportionality is a purely geographical 
one based on the lengths of the coasts of the parties. It compares the ratios of the 
maritime areas allocated to the parties to the dispute. It proceeds from the general 
concept of equity which requires either equal or proportional treatment192. This principle 
is recognized by the jurisprudence of international tribunals as well as seen in state 
practice. In the 1982 Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf Case, the ICJ declared that 
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proportionality “is indeed required by the fundamental principle of ensuring an equitable 
delimitation.”193  
 
When applied to the Aegean context, proportionality between the relevant coastal 
lengths of the coasts of Greece and Turkey in the Aegean and the maritime areas 
resulting from a delimitation to be affected is essential. Although proportionality is not a 
legal rule or a method of delimitation, it serves as an important measure of equitableness 
of the resulting continental shelf boundaries in the Aegean Sea. Even in the case of the 
coastal lengths of mainlands of Greece and Turkey are considered, and the islands’ 
coastal fronts are not ignored, there will be disproportion in the areas appertaining to 
Greece and Turkey, in favor of the former, with a ratio of 4.56 to 1194. Therefore, even 
the non-encroachment principle and the enclave method are applied; it will result in 
significant disproportionate areas of continental shelf.   
 
In this regard, Deniz Bölükbaşı proposes three possible methods to be considered in 
order to compensate the disproportionality. He suggests schemes of joint exploration and 
exploitation; an areal compensation in favor of Turkey in the Aegean and compensation 
in the Mediterranean195. However, the compensation issue is neither a widely accepted 
phenomenon in international law nor an example of state practice in the issue of 
maritime delimitation. Consequently, despite the fact that proportionality is accepted as 
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an equitable solution, it is questionable to support any compensation to Turkey due to 
the delimitation of continental shelf areas in the Aegean Sea.  
 
In sum, it is possible to say that the extraordinary features of the Aegean Sea necessitate 
the consideration of the special circumstances and the application of equitable 
principles, just as it is mentioned in international law. Otherwise, when taken as an 
ordinary case, the characteristics of the sea leads the way to an unequal solution where 
the articles of conventions and definitions will by themselves result in the abuse of the 
rights. It is important here to note that, the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea says: 
“States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under this 
Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms 
recognized in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an 
abuse of right.”196 
 
 
6.3 Obligation to Negotiate 
 
In the light of the previous chapters, it is seen that Greece and Turkey could not come to 
an agreement on delimiting the submarine areas in the Aegean. Although the two 
Aegean states acknowledge one another’s right to continental shelf, the contradiction is 
about where to draw the boundary line in the Aegean Sea. As seen in the historical 
display of relevant events stated in Chapter Four, Greece and Turkey not only could not 
agree on a boundary line, but they also were incompetent of agreeing on minimal terms 
that would help them bring the issue to an international arbitration. In the negotiations 
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that took place between the two, Turkey gives priority to negotiations whereas Greece 
speaks of a judicial settlement.  
 
The fact that Turkey does not favor an ICJ settlement has nothing to do with the 
presumption that Turkey would not benefit from it. The fact is that, contrary to the 
Greek claims, Turkey argues that there are actually many disputes that should be settled 
along with the continental shelf issue197. On the other hand, Greece believes that direct 
negotiations as Turkey puts forward would put Greece in a situation to accept the 
existence of other relevant disputes such as the delimitation of the territorial sea and the 
airspace. This will force Greece to make compromises on these issues; therefore it is 
unacceptable since Turkey might succeed in gaining more Greek rights in the Aegean 
Sea198.  
 
Firstly, continental shelf is an area that falls outside the territorial sea as defined above. 
Therefore, the length of the territorial sea directly affects the areas that would be left to 
be called as continental shelf. For this reason, any change in the breadth of the territorial 
sea on the Greek side, which Greece argues that is has the right to enlarge up to 12 
miles, would considerably decrease the areas left to be claimed as continental shelf. The 
Turkish argument thus makes sense because it wants the territorial sea issue to have a 
precision in the first place, in order not to affect the continental shelf issue afterwards. In 
addition, any delimitation on the part of the continental shelf will have an effect on the 
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delimitation of the fishery zones or in its contemporary terms the exclusive economic 
zones in the Aegean. As these have not reached to a precision as well, the sole 
settlement of the continental shelf dispute would not put an end to the disputes of the 
two coastal states.  
 
In this context, the Greek stubbornness on ignoring relevant issues of maritime 
delimitation in the Aegean Sea puts the matter into difficulties. Not only the delimitation 
of the continental shelf areas in the Aegean is a complex issue because of the unique 
characteristics of the semi-enclosed sea, but the possibly of a change in the extent of 
territorial sea or other relevant factors that would also bring the continental shelf issue 
back to where it started, if the issue is to be resolved independent of other maritime 
issues between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea.  
 
As for Turkey’s persistence on negotiations before taking the matter to a judicial 
settlement, it is seen that in international law resorting to an international court is not 
compulsory, whereas it is an obligation for a state to negotiate its differences or disputes 
with other states199. Not only customary law encourages states to settle their disputes 
between the parties, but also Article 33 of the UN Charter, Article 6 of the Geneva 
Convention on Law of the Sea and Articles 74 and 83 of the 1982 Convention attach 
considerable significance to the agreement of the parties when the case is delimiting 
maritime areas200.  
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Another thing to bear in mind is that, in this dispute, the parties agree on almost nothing 
which makes things even more complicated; because the parties need to fully negotiate 
their differences before going to the Court so as to identify their points on which they 
agree or disagree201. Even if they do not agree on the areas of delimitation; on the 
sources of law to be applied to the dispute; on the means of interpretation of a definite 
legal norm; if they do apply to the Court under these circumstances what would be the 
attitude of the Court in resolving the dispute? Without a clear agreement, will the Court 
unilaterally draw a boundary line in the Aegean or will it simply indicate the principles 
that will be applicable for the delimitation of the continental shelf? These issues remain 
to be vague, but can only be clarified during the proceedings of counter memorial, reply 
and rejoinder in accordance with the statue of the Court to be pursued during the 
proceedings202.  
 
 
6.4 Case Law Regarding Delimitation of the Continental Shelf 
 
As Turkey is not bounded by the 1958 and 1982 Conventions, the solution to the dispute 
between Greece and Turkey is tried to be dealt in accordance with customary law. When 
looked from a broader perspective, it is seen that the customary law has also been built 
upon compliance with the terms of the international conventions and also by judicial 
decisions and state practices that gained support in the international scene.  
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In the context of the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, several distinct international 
adjudication cases, such as arbitral court decisions and the decisions of the ICJ, on 
continental shelf and maritime delimitation, gives direction to an equitable and fair 
settlement in the Aegean: The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases of 1969; the Channel 
Islands Arbitral Award of 1977; the Tunisia/Libya Case of 1982; the Gulf of Maine Case 
of 1984; the Libya/Malta Case of 1985; the Case of St.Pierre and Miquelon of 1992; Jan 
Mayen Case of 1993; Eritrea-Yemen Arbitral Award of 1999, the  Qatar-Bahrain Case 
of 2001 and the Cameroon-Nigeria Case of 2002. Each of them serves as a guide for 
rules to be employed in cases of delimitation of the continental shelf. For the purposes of 
this thesis, only relevant parts will be analyzed in these cases. 
 
The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases of 1969, which was referred to the ICJ, 
comprises the initial case that the Court gave its opinion in the status of the articles in 
question and laid down the general principles regarding the legal basis of the continental 
shelf. The case concerned the delimitation of continental shelf between Denmark, the 
Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany. The coastal states were in 
comparable positions so far as the length of their coastlines were concerned. In referring 
the case to the Court, Denmark and the Netherlands upheld the equidistance line, 
whereas Germany stood up for a solution based on equity.  
 
The Court made the observation that “more important is the fact that the doctrine of just 
and equitable share appears to be wholly at variance with what the Court entertains no 
doubt is the most fundamental of all the rules of law relating to the continental 
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shelf…”203 In relation to this observation, it indisputably decided that the most 
fundamental of all the rules of law relating to the continental shelf was the principle of 
natural prolongation. It stated that the application of the equidistance method would 
cause parts of the natural prolongation of one state to be allocated to another due to the 
configuration of the coasts of the states concerned. This was the basic logic behind the 
Court resorting to equitable principles. It stated that the continental shelf of a state must 
be the natural prolongation of its land territory and must not encroach upon the natural 
prolongation of another state204. 
 
Serving as a source of international law, this judgment was highly recognized by the 
international community. In sense of the importance attributed to the integrity of the 
natural prolongation it also helps to solve the dispute in the Aegean Sea, as an equitable 
principle explained above in this Chapter.  
 
The Channel Islands Case of 1977 is of great value as well in delimiting continental 
shelf areas between states. The Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration resembles to 
the Aegean Case in that they both display cases where islands of one state lie in close 
proximity to another state’s mainland205. The Court was asked to draw a boundary line 
for the continental shelf areas, where the United Kingdom was supporting the right of 
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islands to continental shelf on the French coast and France was defending the non-
encroachment of its extension towards the sea206.  
 
In its judgment, the Court of Arbitration stressed the significance of equity stating, 
“…failing agreement, the boundary between States abutting on the same continental 
shelf is to be determined on equitable principles.”207 The Court decided in line with 
equitable principles, on a median line between the mainlands of France and United 
Kingdom, ignoring the British Channel Islands very close to the French coast. 
Consequently, an enclave solution was simultaneously adopted regarding the islands, 
preventing the island from blocking the seaward extension of mainland France208.  
 
If applied to the Aegean Case, although there are more islands to be considered in the 
dispute between Greece and Turkey, the Court’s decision can serve as guidance for a 
similar delimitation. When the seaward extension is the question, the enclave solution 
seems to be the best way for settlement in order to prevent the islands from blocking the 
extension, considering the security interests of the mainland state, in this case Turkey. In 
addition, there exists a natural geographical feature in the Aegean to be taken as a basis 
in drawing the boundary line.  
 
                                                 
206
 The Court pointed to a balance between the mainlands and did not allow the islands to disturb the 
balance. The judgment provided the UK islands with 12 nautical miles territorial sea and no more as for 
continental shelf areas. See ICJ Reports 1977, para. 196. 
207
 ICJ Reports 1977, p. 45. 
208
 ICJ Reports 1977, pp.191-192. 
 96 
Furthermore, the Tribunal clearly observed that the delimitation was not between the UK 
islands and France, but between the UK and France as a whole209. For delimitation, the 
area relevant is taken as a whole, not the area in dispute. This indicates that, for the 
delimitation in the Aegean the whole of the Sea is relevant in settling the dispute, 
contrary to the Greek arguments that the case only involves the area between the Eastern 
Greek islands and the Turkish mainland.  
 
The third relevant case is the Tunisia/Libya Case of 1982.  The two Mediterranean states 
referred their differences on the delimitation of the continental shelf areas lying off their 
respective countries and requested the Court to indicate the principles and rules of 
international law that would be applicable in the concerned case. Both states not being 
parties to the Geneva Convention, it was agreed that the applicable law would be 
customary international law. They also agreed that the concept of natural prolongation 
was to be the commanding principle for delimitation. What the Court would decide was 
the natural prolongations of the states and the equitable principles to be applied as for 
the delimitation210.  
 
Taking into account the developments regarding the evolution of the concept of 
continental shelf especially after the 1969 North Sea Case, the Court came to the 
conclusion that “the concept of natural prolongation was and remains to be examined 
within the context of customary international law.”211 Moreover the Court stated that 
geomorphological features could be examined in order to determine the division 
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between the natural prolongations of the two states and to identify as relevant 
circumstances affecting the course of boundary212. It also added that these circumstances 
would be considered to be the elements of an equitable solution213.  
 
When come to the dispute between Greece and Turkey, the conclusions of the 
Tunisia/Libya Case offers much on the legal rules to apply. The natural prolongation to 
be applied at the first place as a dictation of customary law is the ultimate solution to the 
delimitation problem in the Aegean. Moreover, on the basis of the conclusions of the 
Court, the North-South Depression in the middle of the Aegean can be accepted as a 
geomorphological feature that separates the natural prolongations the of mainlands of 
Greece and Turkey.  
 
The fourth case relevant to the Aegean is the Gulf of Maine Case of 1984. Canada and 
the United States submitted the case and asked the Chamber of the Court to devise a 
single maritime boundary that would be observed by both parties for all purposes 
relating to any claim or exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction over the waters or 
seabed and subsoil by either state against the other214.  
 
The Chamber established that the delimitation should be affected “in accordance with 
equitable principles taking into account all of the relevant circumstances of the case in 
order to produce an equitable result” and added that this would aim “an equal division of 
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areas where the maritime projections of the coasts of the states between which 
delimitation is to be affected converge and overlap.”215 In this respect, the Chamber 
reduced the substantial disproportion between the lengthy coast of the United States and 
short coast of Canada. It also did not make use of the equidistance line and gave only 
partial effect to the island in the area of delimitation216.  
 
Hence, this decision of the Court in 1984 demonstrates that neither the equidistance line 
nor the right of an island to continental shelf is decisive, but they are applicable 
considering the circumstances of each case.  In the case of the Aegean, this conclusion 
works against the Greek claims, where the equidistant line would pass between the 
Eastern Aegean Islands of Greece and mainland of Turkey, based on the islands’ right to 
continental shelf.  
 
Another case relevant to continental shelf delimitation is the Libya/Malta case of 1985. 
In this case, the ICJ was asked to decide the principles and rules applicable to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries and to indicate the 
practical way in which to apply them.  
 
One of the Court’s conclusions in its judgment was that dependent islands would be 
given less weight compared to the independent island states in maritime delimitation217. 
Moreover, it emphasized the semi-enclosed nature of the Mediterranean Sea as 
constituting a special circumstance, considering the maritime areas to be attributed to 
                                                 
215
 ICJ Reports 1984, para. 195,197. 
216
 ICJ Reports 1984, para 197-198. 
217
 ICJ Reports 1985, para 53. 
 99 
individual states in relation with the coastal lengths of mainlands and islands. In this 
respect, the equidistance line was rejected and a delimitation line was decided on, which 
would be close to the Maltese coasts, as it had fewer rights compared to Libya, because 
of its shorter coastline218. 
 
The Libya/Malta Case dictates that the semi-enclosed nature of a sea must be treated as a 
special circumstance. When the rights of islands and mainlands are of concern, the 
coastal length gains real importance. When the Aegean Sea is taken into account, the 
semi-enclosed character of the sea totally blocks the Turkish channels to high seas if the 
Eastern Aegean Islands belonging to Greece are given full effect. In this regard, just as it 
was in the Libya/Malta case, an equidistant line between the Greek islands and mainland 
Turkey will not be an equitable solution, where the length of the vast Turkish coasts will 
be disregarded.  
 
In the Case of St.Pierre and Miquelon of 1992, Canada and France had requested from a 
special Court of Arbitration, the portioning of the maritime area south of these French 
islands. The Arbitral Tribunal gave the French islands a narrow 200 nautical mile 
exclusive economic zone corridor across Grand Banks to the high seas219. The Court 
gave the French islands considerably less power to generate zones than the larger 
Canadian landmasses they are near220. The zone given to the French islands provided a 
corridor to the high seas; however in the final analysis, it fell totally within an area 
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claimed by Canada as exclusive economic zones, in effect creating a French enclave that 
is surrounded by Canadian waters. Thus, the principle of non-encroachment was 
underlined once more with this Case.  
 
In the 1993 judgment of the Court on the Jan Mayen Case, Norway and Denmark had 
resorted to the Court for the delimitation of the continental shelf areas between the 
island of Jan Mayen, which belonged to Norway, and Greenland, which belonged to 
Denmark. Norway asked the Court to draw a median line, however this was rejected as 
the Court stated that the existence of special circumstances would require another 
boundary line221.   
 
It was stated by the Court that the median line as a provisional line may be adjusted or 
shifted in order to achieve an equitable result and more importantly, special 
circumstances justified a boundary line other than the median line222. The Court also 
underlined that the aim of each and every situation was to reach an equitable result. 
From this standpoint, the 1958 Convention required the investigation of any special 
circumstances; on the other hand the customary law based upon equitable principles also 
required the investigation of the relevant circumstances223.  
 
Briefly, the judgment of the Jan Mayen Case guides us for an approach for the 
settlement of the Aegean Case. Considering the extraordinary configuration of the Sea, 
that serves as special circumstances as outlined above, the Case has to be dealt in 
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accordance with equitable principles. The importance of the proportionality between the 
lengths of coasts was also mentioned in the Case; where the considerable smaller ratio of 
the Jan Mayen Island when compared to Greenland was taken into account in shifting 
the boundary line nearer to the Jan Mayen Island224. Considering the coastal length of 
Turkey in the Aegean, it would not be equitable the draw a boundary line that would 
leave disproportionate areas of continental shelf.  
 
The case of Eritrea-Yemen and the judgment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration are 
also instrumental in directing us to an equitable solution in the Aegean. The existence of 
the islands in between was again proposing a question to be solved. Both Parties claimed 
a form of median international boundary line, although their respective claimed median 
lines followed very different courses and did not coincide. The Arbitral Court decided 
on a median line between the opposite mainland coastlines, also taking into account the 
element of proportionality225.  
 
The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration gave no effect whatsoever to the Yemenese islands of 
Jabal al-Tayr and al-Zubayr, because “their barren and inhospitable nature and their 
position well out into the sea” meant that they should not be taken into account in 
computing the boundary line226. Along with the previous cases observed above, it can be 
concluded that tribunals have not given full power to generate maritime zones if the 
outcome of such generation would be to limit the zones created by adjacent or opposite 
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continental land masses227. This should be kept in mind when arguing about the 
maritime areas that the Greek islands would generate opposite to the Turkish mainland 
coasts.  
 
Moreover, the concepts of the “special circumstances” or “relevant circumstances” are 
utilized to include security needs as well as geographical anomalies. The Eritrea-Yemen 
Arbitration quoted from Judge Manfred Lachs’s opinion in the Guinea- Guinea Bissau 
Arbitration, saying that: 
“…our principle concern has been to avoid, by one means or another, one of the 
Parties finding itself faced with the exercise of rights, opposite to and in the 
immediate vicinity of its coasts, which might interfere with its right to 
development or put its security at risk.228”  
 
Therefore, the security considerations of the Turkish coasts needs to be protected as 
Turkey would face the Greek islands exercising its rights so close to its coasts, in case 
the islands are given full-effect. 
 
Lastly, in the Bahrain-Qatar Case of 2001, where the Court was asked to draw maritime 
boundary lines in between, the Court firstly considered whether there had been special 
circumstances and also stressed the concept of relevant circumstances that may affect 
the boundary line, in order to achieve an equitable result229. References to the 
importance of equity were made to previous cases230. 
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The Court stated that, taking into account a maritime feature located well out to sea 
would not lead to an equitable solution in delimiting continental shelf areas. In this 
respect, considerations of equity require that the island of Fasht al Jarim should have no 
effect in determining the boundary line in order not to distort the boundary on the 
maritime delimitation231. If the island had been given full effect, it would have 
disproportionate effects232. In order to avoid this undesirable result and ensure an 
equitable settlement, the Court decided to ignore the feature all together. This decision 
can also be used to argue that the Greek islands in the Eastern Aegean should not be 
given overwhelming significance in the delimitation of the continental shelf areas since 
they are not attached to the Greek mainland and actually not a part of the natural 
prolongation of Greek territory as mentioned above.  
 
Another issue addressed in this case was the question of drawing baselines. Some Greek 
scholars argue that Greece must be let to draw baselines connecting its islands; similar to 
archipelagic states233.  The Court stated in the Qatar-Bahrain Case that it was improper 
to draw baselines around islands that are part of an overall geographical configuration, 
unless they were a fringe of islands along a coastline234. Thus, any claim of Greece on 
having archipelagic waters would be ill-founded when the Case of Qatar-Bahrain is 
taken into consideration. 
 
                                                 
231ICJ Reports 1998, para.s 240-243. 
232
 ICJ Reports 1998, para 247. 
233
 George P. Politiakis The Aegean Dispute in the 1990s: Naval Aspects of the New Law of the Sea 
Convention in Theodore C. Kariotis. (1997), p.300. 
234
 ICJ Reports 1998, para.s 210-216. 
 104 
The Cameroon-Nigeria Case of 2002 can be made use of as well; regarding the approach 
of the Court towards a solution for maritime delimitation. The parties had submitted the 
case “[i]n order to avoid further incidents between the two countries, ... to determine the 
course of the maritime boundary between the two States beyond the line fixed 
in1975”235. The Court in its judgment stresses the importance of achieving an equitable 
result:  
 
“The Court is bound to stress in this connection that delimiting with a concern to 
achieving an equitable result, as required by current international law, is not the 
same as delimiting in equity. The Court’s jurisprudence shows that, in disputes 
relating to maritime delimitation, equity is not a method of delimitation, but solely 
an aim that should be borne in mind in effecting the delimitation.236 
 
 
Before taking the equidistant line as the ultimate boundary for delimitation between the 
parties, the Court first looked whether there had been special circumstances that would 
affect the course of the boundary line. The Court acknowledged that, as noted in the 
Gulf of Maine and Jan Mayen Cases, “… that a substantial difference in the lengths of 
the parties’ respective coastlines may be a factor to be taken into consideration in order 
to adjust or shift the provisional delimitation line”237. The Court also concluded that it 
accepts that islands have sometimes been taken into account as a relevant circumstance 
in delimitation when such islands lay within the zone to be delimited and fell under the 
sovereignty of one of the parties238.  
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The case itself was not bearing these special circumstances and therefore the Court ruled 
in favor of the equidistance line; however it is significant in pointing out that these 
elements would come first before giving the final verdict. Thus, the Cameroon-Nigeria 
Case should be an example for all maritime delimitation disputes, including the Aegean 
continental shelf dispute; with regards to the priority it gives to the special circumstances 
to achieve an equitable result.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
It is an irrefutable fact that the dispute in the Aegean needs to be resolved as early as 
possible, when both political and economic losses from dragging the issue on is taken 
into account. It is equally important to solve the matter in line with international legal 
rules and to agree on a solution on a mutual basis; where both sides will be satisfied of a 
fair result.  
 
To come up with a solid and legally acceptable suggestion to deal with the continental 
shelf dispute necessitates the agreement of some common grounds between the two 
states at the first place. This should first of all include that the Aegean Sea is a common 
sea between Greece and Turkey where both countries should respect each other’s vital 
interests. There is no sense in striving for a “Greek Lake” in the Aegean or ignoring the 
fundamental legal rights of islands that stem from international law.  
 
Under the current law, both states have the right to claim to continental shelf areas in the 
Aegean Sea. Any definition of maritime areas should be based on mutual consent and 
should be beneficiary, fair and equitable for both parties.  
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Driving from this logic, the second thing to agree on should be the existence of several 
inter-related disputes in the Aegean that have a considerable effect on the continental 
shelf dispute. For this reason, it is a must for Greece and Turkey to negotiate their 
differences before going to an international court for the settlement of the dispute. By no 
means there is any possibility to have a permanent solution in the case of continental 
shelf, without taking into consideration the other disagreements, especially the volatility 
of the extent of the Greek territorial waters. In this context, negotiations should be held 
even in the case of referring the dispute to an international court; firstly to cover all the 
related issues and secondly to define what is ultimately demanded from the court. 
 
Thirdly, it is not a high possibility that the Greek claims of an equidistant line would 
find support with regards to international law. Not only this claim is inconsistent with 
the geographical features of the Aegean, but also it ignores the most basic norms of 
delimitation; the natural prolongation and the existence of special circumstances that 
derives from the semi-enclosed nature of the sea and the extraordinary situations of the 
Greek islands.  
 
For an equitable solution, those areas in the Aegean that are not territorial seas and do 
not belong to any of the countries under the title of continental shelf, should be divided 
into two, complying with the equity and fairness principle. This does not mean that the 
remaining areas should be distributed to Greece and Turkey evenly, but actually these 
areas can be shared taking into consideration the geographical depression that divides 
the sea from the north to the south.  For instance in the North Aegean, the boundary line 
would be much closer to the Turkish mainland, due to the Meriç River and due to the 
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length of the Greek coast when compared to the Turkish in the region.239. This 
settlement will not only comply with international law, but it will also take into 
consideration fundamental security interests of both states.  
 
There is no doubt that these conflicts will go on so long as no effort is made for 
negotiation. Some scholars argue that the best approach is to postpone the delimitation 
issue as long as possible, unless active exploration or exploitation of resources occur or 
is anticipated. Nevertheless, I maintain that Greece and Turkey can no longer afford to 
postpone the Aegean Sea disputes. Not only this situation increases tension in every 
single event, as it was in the Kardak Crisis, but it also stands as an obstacle in front of 
other bilateral relationships between the two states.  
 
Especially in an era when Turkey goes for European Union membership, it can not bear 
any major conflicts with a member state, not to mention that Greece is a neighboring 
state both at the sea and the land.  Since Turkey is accepted as a candidate state to the 
EU in December 1999, the obligation to settle the dispute at the Aegean Sea is felt 
profoundly. The decisions of the Helsinki Summit of 1999 and Agenda 2000 impose 
political and legal obligations to both sides to settle their major border disputes through 
peaceful means or to accept to refer their disputes to the ICJ. As opposed to the 
unwilling attitude of both states to open dialogue and solve the matter immediately, the 
EU factor forces the two Aegean states to discuss their disagreements. Although Greece 
and Turkey have shown efforts in this respect and conducted several meetings in the 
Prime Ministerial level in a variety of areas, no concrete solution for the maritime 
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delimitation issues in between has been put forward. Consequently, the two states can 
not avoid settling the dispute and needs to peacefully negotiate the issue in the short-
term.  
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APPENDIX A  
 
RELEVANT ARTICLES OF THE LAUSANNE PEACE TREATY 
(24 JULY 1923) 
 
SECTION I. 
I. TERRITORIAL CLAUSES. 
ARTICLE 2.  
From the Black Sea to the Aegean the frontier of Turkey is laid down as follows: (I) 
With Bulgaria:  
From the mouth of the River Rezvaya, to the River Maritza, the point of junction of the 
three frontiers of Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece:  
the southern frontier of Bulgaria as at present demarcated;  
(2) With Greece:  
Thence to the confluence of the Arda and the Maritza:  
the course of the Maritza;  
then upstream along the Arda, up to a point on that river to be determined on the spot in 
the immediate neighborhood of the village of Tchorek-Keuy:  
the course of the Arda;  
thence in a south-easterly direction up to a point on the Maritza, 1 km. below Bosna-
Keuy:  
a roughly straight line leaving in Turkish territory the village of Bosna-Keuy. The 
village of Tchorek-Keuy shall be assigned to Greece or to Turkey according as the 
majority of the population shall be found to be Greek or Turkish by the Commission for 
which provision is made in Article 5, the population which has migrated into this village 
after the 11th October, 1922, not being taken into account;  
thence to the AEgean Sea:  
the course of the Maritza.  
ARTICLE 5.  
A Boundary Commission will be appointed to trace on the ground the frontier defined in 
Article 2 (2). This Commission will be composed of representatives of Greece and of 
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Turkey, each Power appointing one representative, and a president chosen by them from 
the nationals of a third Power.  
They shall endeavor in all cases to follow as nearly as possible the descriptions given in 
the present Treaty, taking into account as far as possible administrative boundaries and 
local economic interests.  
The decision of the Commission will be taken by a majority and shall be binding on the 
parties concerned.  
The expenses of the Commission shall be borne in equal shares by the parties concerned.  
ARTICLE 6.  
In so far as concerns frontiers defined by a waterway as distinct from its banks, the 
phrases "course" or "channel" used in the descriptions of the present Treaty signify, as 
regards non-navigable rivers, the median line of the waterway or of its principal branch, 
and, as regards navigable rivers, the median line of the principal channel of navigation. 
It will rest with the Boundary Commission to specify whether the frontier line shall 
follow any changes of the course or channel which may take place, or whether it shall be 
definitely fixed by the position of the course or channel at the time when the present 
Treaty comes into force.  
In the absence of provisions to the contrary, in the present Treaty, islands and islets 
Iying within three miles of the coast are included within the frontier of the coastal State.  
ARTICLE 12.  
The decision taken on the 13th February, 1914, by the Conference of London, in virtue 
of Articles 5 of the Treaty of London of the 17th-30th May, 1913, and 15 of the Treaty 
of Athens of the 1st-14th November, 1913, which decision was communicated to the 
Greek Government on the 13th February, 1914, regarding the sovereignty of Greece 
over the islands of the Eastern Mediterranean, other than the islands of Imbros, Tenedos 
and Rabbit Islands, particularly the islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, 
Samos and Nikaria, is confirmed, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty 
respecting the islands placed under the sovereignty of Italy which form the subject of 
Article 15.  
Except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the islands 
situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish sovereignty.  
ARTICLE 13.  
With a view to ensuring the maintenance of peace, the Greek Government undertakes to 
observe the following restrictions in the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria:  
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(I) No naval base and no fortification will be established in the said islands.  
(2) Greek military aircraft will be forbidden to fly over the territory of the Anatolian 
coast. Reciprocally, the Turkish Government will forbid their military aircraft to fly over 
the said islands.  
(3) The Greek military forces in the said islands will be limited to the normal contingent 
called up for military service, which can be trained on the spot, as well as to a force of 
gendarmerie and police in proportion to the force of gendarmerie and police existing in 
the whole of the Greek territory.  
ARTICLE 14.  
The islands of Imbros and Tenedos, remaining under Turkish sovereignty, shall enjoy a 
special administrative organization composed of local elements and furnishing every 
guarantee for the native non-Moslem population in so far as concerns local 
administration and the protection of persons and property. The maintenance of order will 
be assured therein by a police force recruited from amongst the local population by the 
local administration above provided for and placed under its orders.  
The agreements which have been, or may be, concluded between Greece and Turkey 
relating to the exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations will not be applied to the 
inhabitants of the islands of Imbros and Tenedos.  
ARTICLE 15.  
Turkey renounces in favor of Italy all rights and title over the following islands: 
Stampalia (Astrapalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), 
Piscopis (Tilos), Misiros (Nisyros), Calimnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos 
(Lipso), Simi (Symi), and Cos (Kos), which are now occupied by Italy, and the islets 
dependent thereon, and also over the island of Castellorizzo.  
ARTICLE 16.  
Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories 
situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than 
those over which her sovereignty is recognized by the said Treaty, the future of these 
territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned.  
The provisions of the present Article do not prejudice any special arrangements arising 
from neighborly relations which have been or may be concluded between Turkey and 
any limitrophe countries.  
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ARTICLE 20.  
Turkey hereby recognizes the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British 
Government on the sth November, 1914.  
ARTICLE 21.  
Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the 5th November, 1914, will acquire 
British nationality subject to the conditions laid down in the local law, and will 
thereupon lose their Turkish nationality. They will, however, have the right to opt for 
Turkish nationality within two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, 
provided that they leave Cyprus within twelve months after having so opted.  
Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the coming into force of the present 
Treaty who, at that date, have acquired or are in process of acquiring British nationality 
in consequence of a request made in accordance with the local law, will also thereupon 
lose their Turkish nationality.  
It is understood that the Government of Cyprus will be entitled to refuse British 
nationality to inhabitants of the island who, being Turkish nationals, had formerly 
acquired another nationality without the consent of the Turkish Government.  
ARTICLE 26.  
Turkey hereby recognizes and accepts the frontiers of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Hungary, Poland, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and the 
Czechoslovak State, as these frontiers have been or may be determined by the Treaties 
referred to in Article 25 or by any supplementary conventions.  
Source: http://www.hri.org/docs/lausanne/  
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APPENDIX B 
 
TREATY OF NEUTRALITY, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION 
(30 OCTOBER 1930) 
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Source: Kılıç, Hulusi. Bilateral Agreements, Essential Documents and Declarations 
between Turkey and Greece since the Proclamation of the Turkish Republic Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, (Ankara: Deputy Directorate General for 
Maritime and Aviation Affairs, 2000) 
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APPENDIX C  
 
THE PACT OF CORDIAL FRIENDSHIP 
 (14 September 1933)  
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Source: Kılıç, Hulusi. Bilateral Agreements, Essential Documents and Declarations 
between Turkey and Greece since the Proclamation of the Turkish Republic Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, (Ankara: Deputy Directorate General for 
Maritime and Aviation Affairs, 2000) 
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APPENDIX D 
THE BATHIMETRIC MAP OF THE AEGEAN SEA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: www.izmir.bel.tr  
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APPENDIX E  
 
RELEVANT ARTICLES OF  
THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 
Article76 
Definition of the continental shelf 
1. The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation 
of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that 
distance. 
2. The continental shelf of a coastal State shall not extend beyond the limits provided for 
in paragraphs 4 to 6. 
3. The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the 
coastal State, and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise. It 
does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof. 
4. (a) For the purposes of this Convention, the coastal State shall establish the outer edge 
of the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from 
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by either: 
(i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference 
to the outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of 
sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent of the shortest distance 
from such point to the foot of the continental slope; or 
(ii) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference 
to fixed points not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of 
the continental slope. 
(b) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the continental 
slope shall be determined as the point of maximum change in the gradient 
at its base. 
5. The fixed points comprising the line of the outer limits of the continental shelf on the 
seabed, drawn in accordance with paragraph 4 (a)(i) and (ii), either shall not exceed 
350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath, which is a 
line connecting the depth of 2,500 metres. 
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6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, on submarine ridges, the outer limit of 
the continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. This paragraph does not apply to submarine 
elevations that are natural components of the continental margin, such as its plateaux, 
rises, caps, banks and spurs. 
7. The coastal State shall delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf, where that 
shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea is measured, by straight lines not exceeding 60 nautical miles in length, 
connecting fixed points, defined by coordinates of latitude and longitude. 
8. Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured shall be submitted by 
the coastal State to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under 
Annex II on the basis of equitable geographical representation. The Commission shall 
make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the 
outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal 
State on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding. 
9. The coastal State shall deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
charts and relevant information, including geodetic data, permanently describing the 
outer limits of its continental shelf. The Secretary-General shall give due publicity 
thereto. 
10. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the question of delimitation of 
the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts. 
 
Article77 
Rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf 
1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose 
of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. 
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State 
does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may 
undertake these activities without the express consent of the coastal State. 
3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, 
effective or notional, or on any express proclamation. 
4. The natural resources referred to in this Part consist of the mineral and other non-
living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to 
sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are 
 134 
immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical 
contact with the seabed or the subsoil. 
 
Article78 
Legal status of the superjacent waters and air space 
and the rights and freedoms of other States 
1. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the legal status 
of the superjacent waters or of the air space above those waters. 
2. The exercise of the rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf must not 
infringe or result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights and 
freedoms of other States as provided for in this Convention. 
 
Article79 
Submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf 
1. All States are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf, 
in accordance with the provisions of this article. 
2. Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental 
shelf, the exploitation of its natural resources and the prevention, reduction and control 
of pollution from pipelines, the coastal State may not impede the laying or maintenance 
of such cables or pipelines. 
3. The delineation of the course for the laying of such pipelines on the continental shelf 
is subject to the consent of the coastal State. 
4. Nothing in this Part affects the right of the coastal State to establish conditions for 
cables or pipelines entering its territory or territorial sea, or its jurisdiction over cables 
and pipelines constructed or used in connection with the exploration of its continental 
shelf or exploitation of its resources or the operations of artificial islands, installations 
and structures under its jurisdiction. 
5. When laying submarine cables or pipelines, States shall have due regard to cables or 
pipelines already in position. In particular, possibilities of repairing existing cables or 
pipelines shall not be prejudiced. 
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Article80 
Artificial islands, installations and structures on the continental shelf 
Article 60 applies mutatis mutandis to artificial islands, installations and structures on 
the continental shelf. 
 
Article81 
Drilling on the continental shelf 
The coastal State shall have the exclusive right to authorize and regulate drilling on the 
continental shelf for all purposes. 
 
Article82 
Payments and contributions with respect to the 
exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles 
1. The coastal State shall make payments or contributions in kind in respect of the 
exploitation of the non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
2. The payments and contributions shall be made annually with respect to all production 
at a site after the first five years of production at that site. For the sixth year, the rate of 
payment or contribution shall be 1 per cent of the value or volume of production at the 
site. The rate shall increase by 1 per cent for each subsequent year until the twelfth year 
and shall remain at 7 per cent thereafter. Production does not include resources used in 
connection with exploitation. 
3. A developing State which is a net importer of a mineral resource produced from its 
continental shelf is exempt from making such payments or contributions in respect of 
that mineral resource. 
4. The payments or contributions shall be made through the Authority, which shall 
distribute them to States Parties to this Convention, on the basis of equitable sharing 
criteria, taking into account the interests and needs of developing States, particularly the 
least developed and the land-locked among them. 
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Article83 
Delimitation of the continental shelf 
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts 
1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an 
equitable solution. 
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the States 
concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV. 
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit of 
understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize 
or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without 
prejudice to the final delimitation. 
4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, questions relating 
to the delimitation of the continental shelf shall be determined in accordance with the 
provisions of that agreement. 
 
Article84 
Charts and lists of geographical coordinates 
1. Subject to this Part, the outer limit lines of the continental shelf and the lines of 
delimitation drawn in accordance with article 83 shall be shown on charts of a scale or 
scales adequate for ascertaining their position. Where appropriate, lists of geographical 
coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, may be substituted for such outer 
limit lines or lines of delimitation. 
2. The coastal State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical 
coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations and, in the case of those showing the outer limit lines of the 
continental shelf, with the Secretary-General of the Authority. 
 
Article85 
Tunnelling 
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This Part does not prejudice the right of the coastal State to exploit the subsoil by means 
of tunnelling, irrespective of the depth of water above the subsoil. 
 
Article121 
Regime of islands 
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above 
water at high tide. 
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory. 
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have 
no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. 
 
Article122 
Definition 
For the purposes of this Convention, "enclosed or semi-enclosed sea" means a gulf, 
basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean 
by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive 
economic zones of two or more coastal States. 
 
Article123 
Cooperation of States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas 
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other in 
the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties under this Convention. 
To this end they shall endeavour, directly or through an appropriate regional 
organization: 
(a) to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and 
exploitation of the living resources of the sea; 
(b) to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with 
respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
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(c) to coordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where 
appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area; 
(d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international 
organizations to cooperate with them in furtherance of the provisions of 
this article. 
 
Article300 
Good faith and abuse of rights 
States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention 
and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in 
a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right 
 
Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm  
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APPENDIX F 
THE GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 
(21 APRIL 1958) 
The States Parties to this Convention,  
Have agreed as follows:  
Article 1  
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf" is used as referring (a) to 
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area 
of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of 
the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said 
areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of 
islands. 
Article 2  
1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose 
of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.  
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are exclusive in the sense that if the 
coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no 
one may undertake these activities, or make a claim to the continental shelf, without the 
express consent of the coastal State.  
3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, 
effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.  
4. The natural resources referred to in these articles consist of the mineral and other non-
living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to 
sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are 
immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical 
contact with the seabed or the subsoil.  
Article 3  
The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of 
the superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the airspace above those waters.  
Article 4  
Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental 
shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources, the coastal State may not impede the 
laying or maintenance of submarine cables or pipe lines on the continental shelf. 
 140 
Article 5  
1. The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources 
must not result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the 
conservation of the living resources of the sea, nor result in any interference with 
fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research carried out with the intention of 
open publication.  
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 6 of this article, the coastal State is 
entitled to construct and maintain or operate on the continental shelf installations and 
other devices necessary for its exploration and the exploitation of its natural resources, 
and to establish safety zones around such installations and devices and to take in those 
zones measures necessary for their protection.  
3. The safety zones referred to in paragraph 2 of this article may extend to a distance of 
500 metres around the installations and other devices which have been erected, 
measured from each point of their outer edge. Ships of all nationalities must respect 
these safety zones.  
4. Such installations and devices, though under the jurisdiction of the coastal State, do 
not possess the status of islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their 
presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea of the coastal State.  
5. Due notice must be given of the construction of any such installations, and permanent 
means for giving warning of their presence must be maintained. Any installations which 
are abandoned or disused must be entirely removed.  
6. Neither the installations or devices, nor the safety zones around them, may be 
established where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential 
to international navigation.  
7. The coastal State is obliged to undertake, in the safety zones, all appropriate measures 
for the protection of the living resources of the sea from harmful agents.  
8. The consent of the coastal State shall be obtained in respect of any research 
concerning the continental shelf and undertaken there. Nevertheless the coastal State 
shall not normally withhold its consent if the request is submitted by a qualified 
institution with a view to purely scientific research into the physical or biological 
characteristics of the continental shelf, subject to the proviso that the coastal State shall 
have the right, if it so desires, to participate or to be represented in the research, and that 
in any event the results shall be published.  
Article 6  
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States 
whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining 
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to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of 
agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the 
boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points 
of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.  
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States, 
the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In 
the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special 
circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of 
equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea of each State is measured.  
3. In delimiting the boundaries of the continental shelf, any lines which are drawn in 
accordance with the principles set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article should be 
defined with reference to charts and geographical features as they exist at a particular 
date, and reference should be made to fixed permanent identifiable points on the land.  
Article 7  
The provisions of these articles shall not prejudice the right of the coastal State to exploit 
the subsoil by means of tunnelling irrespective of the depth of water above the subsoil.  
Article 8  
This Convention shall, until 31 October 1958, be open for signature by all States 
Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies, and by any other 
State invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a Party to the 
Convention.  
Article 9  
This Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.  
Article 10  
This Convention shall be open for accession by any States belonging to any of the 
categories mentioned in article 8. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.  
Article 11  
1. This Convention shall come into force on the thirtieth day following the date of 
deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.  
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2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the twenty-
second instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on 
the thirtieth day after deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or accession.  
Article 12  
1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make reservations to 
articles of the Convention other than to articles 1 to 3 inclusive.  
2. Any Contracting State making a reservation in accordance with the preceding 
paragraph may at any time withdraw the reservation by a communication to that effect 
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.  
Article 13  
1. After the expiration of a period of five years from the date on which this Convention 
shall enter into force, a request for the revision of this Convention may be made at any 
time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.  
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be 
taken in respect of such request.  
Article 14  
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States Members of the 
United Nations and the other States referred to in article 8:  
(a) Of signatures to this Convention and of the deposit of instruments of ratification or 
accession, in accordance with articles 8, 9 and 10;  
(b) Of the date on which this Convention will come into force, in accordance with article 
11;  
(c) Of requests for revision in accordance with article 13;  
(d) Of reservations to this Convention, in accordance with article 12. 
Article 15  
The original of this Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, who shall send certified copies thereof to all States referred to in article 
8.  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized 
thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention.  
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DONE at Geneva, this twenty-ninth day of April one thousand nine hundred and fifty-
eight. 
Source: http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/genevacs.htm 
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APPENDIX G  
 
LIST OF MEMBER STATES TO UNCLOS 
 
 
Albania (23 June 2003)  
Algeria (11 June 1996)  
Angola ( 5 December 1990)  
Antigua and Barbuda ( 2 February 1989)  
Argentina (1 December 1995)  
Armenia (9 December 2002)  
Australia (5 October 1994)  
Austria (14 July 1995)  
Bahamas (29 July 1983)  
Bahrain (30 May 1985)  
Bangladesh (27 July 2001)  
Barbados (12 October 1993)  
Belgium (13 November 1998)  
Belize (13 August 1983)  
Benin (16 October 1997)  
Bolivia  (28 April 1995)  
Bosnia and Herzegovina (12 January 1994)  
Botswana (2 May 1990)  
Brazil (22 December 1988)  
Brunei Darussalam (5 November 1996)  
Bulgaria (15 May 1996)  
Burkina Faso (25 January 2005) 
Cameroon (19 November 1985)  
Canada (7 November 2003) 
Cape Verde (10 August 1987)  
Chile (25 August 1997)  
China (7 June 1996)  
Comoros (21 June 1994)  
Cook Islands (15 February 1995)  
Costa Rica (21 September 1992)  
Côte d'Ivoire (26 March 1984)  
Croatia (5 April 1995)  
Cuba (15 August 1984)  
Cyprus (12 December 1988)  
Czech Republic (21 June 1996)  
Democratic Republic of the Congo (17 February 1989)  
Denmark (16 November 2004) 
Djibouti ( 8 October 1991)  
Dominica (24 October 1991)  
Egypt (26 August 1983)  
Equatorial Guinea (21 July 1997)  
Estonia (26 August 2005) 
European Community (1 April 1998)  
Fiji (10 December 1982)  
Finland (21 June 1996)  
France (11 April 1996)  
Gabon (11 March 1998)  
Gambia (22 May 1984)  
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Georgia (21 March 1996 )  
Germany (14 October 1994)  
Ghana (7 June 1983)  
Greece (21 July 1995)  
Grenada (25 April 1991)  
Guatemala (11 February 1997)  
Guinea (6 September 1985)  
Guinea-Bissau (25 August 1986)  
Guyana (16 November 1993)  
Haiti (31 July 1996)  
Honduras (5 October 1993)  
Hungary (5 February 2002)  
Iceland (21 June 1985)  
India (29 June 1995)  
Indonesia (3 February 1986)  
Iraq  (30 July 1985)  
Ireland (21 June 1996)  
Italy (13 January 1995)  
Jamaica (21 March 1983)  
Japan (20 June 1996)  
Jordan (27 November 1995)  
Kenya (2 March 1989)  
Kiribati (24 February 2003)  
Kuwait (2 May 1986)  
Lao People's Democratic Republic (5 June 1998)  
Latvia (23 December 2004) 
Lebanon (5 January 1995)  
Lithuania (12 November 2003) 
Luxembourg (5 October 2000)  
Madagascar (22 August 2001)  
Malaysia (14 October 1996)  
Maldives (7 September 2000)  
Mali (16 July 1985)  
Malta (20 May 1993)  
Marshall Islands (9 August 1991)  
Mauritania (17 July 1996)  
Mauritius (4 November 1994)  
Mexico (18 March 1983)  
Micronesia (Federated States of) (29 April 1991)  
Monaco (20 March 1996)  
Mongolia (13 August 1996)  
Mozambique (13 March 1997)  
Myanmar (21 May 1996)  
Namibia (18 April 1983)  
Nauru (23 January 1996)  
Nepal (2 November 1998)  
Netherlands (28 June 1996)  
New Zealand (19 July 1996)  
Nicaragua (3 May 2000)  
Nigeria (14 August 1986)  
Norway (24 June 1996)  
Oman (17 August 1989)  
Pakistan (26 February 1997)  
Palau (30 September 1996)  
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Panama (1 July 1996)  
Papua New Guinea (14 January 1997)  
Paraguay (26 September 1986)  
Philippines (8 May 1984)  
Poland (13 November 1998)  
Portugal (3 November 1997)  
Qatar (9 December 2002)  
Republic of Korea (29 January 1996)  
Romania (17 December 1996)  
Russian Federation (12 March 1997)  
Saint Kitts and Nevis (7 January 1993)  
Saint Lucia (27 March 1985)  
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (1 October 1993)  
Samoa (14 August 1995)  
Sao Tome and Principe (3 November 1987)  
Saudi Arabia (24 April 1996)  
Senegal (25 October 1984)  
Serbia and Montenegro (12 March 2001)  
Seychelles (16 September 1991)  
Sierra Leone (12 December 1994)  
Singapore (17 November 1994)  
Slovakia (8 May 1996)  
Slovenia (16 June 1995)  
Solomon Islands (23 June 1997)  
Somalia (24 July 1989)  
South Africa (23 December 1997)  
Spain (15 January 1997)  
Sri Lanka (19 July 1994)  
Sudan (23 January 1985)  
Suriname (9 July 1998)  
Sweden (25 June 1996)  
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (19 August 1994)  
Togo (16 April 1985)  
Tonga (2 August 1995)  
Trinidad and Tobago (25 April 1986)  
Tunisia (24 April 1985)  
Tuvalu (9 December 2002)  
Uganda (9 November 1990)  
Ukraine (26 July 1999)  
United Kingdom of Great Britain and   Northern Ireland (25 July 1997)  
United Republic of Tanzania (30 September 1985)  
Uruguay (10 December 1992)  
Vanuatu (10 August 1999)  
Viet Nam (25 July 1994)  
Yemen (21 July 1987)  
Zambia (7 March 1983)  
Zimbabwe (24 February 1993)  
 
 
Source: 
Http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm 
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APPENDIX H 
THE ILLUSTRATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: V.E. McKelvey, Interpreation of the UNCLOS III Definiton of the Continental 
Shelf, in D.M. Johnston and N.G. Letalik (Ed.s), The Law of the Sea and Ocean 
Industry: New Opportunities and Restraints. Proceedings of the 16th annual Conference 
of the Law of the Sea Institute, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1982, (Honolulu, 1984), p.466.  
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APPENDIX I  
 
THE CHART PUBLISHED IN TURKISH OFFICIAL GAZETTE  
(1 NOVEMBER 1973) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bölükbaşı, Deniz. Turkey and Greece: The Aegean Disputes, A Unique Case in 
International Law, (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2004) 
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APPENDIX J  
 
THE CHART PUBLISHED IN TURKISH OFFICIAL GAZETTE  
(6 JUNE 1974) 
 
 
 
Source: Bölükbaşı, Deniz. Turkey and Greece: The Aegean Disputes, A Unique Case in 
International Law, (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2004) 
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APPENDIX K  
 
THE CHART PUBLISHED IN TURKISH OFFICIAL GAZETTE  
(18 JULY 1974) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bölükbaşı, Deniz. Turkey and Greece: The Aegean Disputes, A Unique Case in 
International Law, (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2004) 
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APPENDIX L  
 
BRUSSELS COMMUNIQUE 
(31 May 1975) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), International Court of 
Justice Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, (Netherlands: 1980) 
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APPENDIX M 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION No. 395  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1976/scres76.htm  
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APPENDIX N 
 
ACTE GENERAL POUR LE REGLEMENT PACIFIQUE DES DIFFERENDS 
INTERNATIONAUX 
 
(26 September 1928) 
 
 
Article 1 
Les différends de toute nature entre deux ou plusieurs Parties ayant adhéré au présent 
Acte général qui n’auraient pu être résolus par la voie diplomatique seront, sauf les 
réserves éventuelles prévues à l’art. 39, soumis à la procédure de conciliation dans les 
conditions prévues au présent chapitre. 
Article 17 
Tous différends au sujet desquels les parties se contesteraient réciproquement un droit 
seront, sauf les réserves éventuelles prévues à l’art. 39, soumis pour jugement à la Cour 
permanente de Justice internationale, à moins que les parties ne tombent d’accord, dans 
les termes prévus ci—après, pour recourir à un tribunal arbitral. Il est entendu que les 
différends ci—dessus visés comprennent notamment ceux que mentionne l’art. 36 du 
Statut de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale. 
 
Article 33 
 
1.  Dans tous les cas où le différend fait l’objet d’une procédure arbitrale ou judiciaire, 
notamment si la question au sujet de laquelle les parties sont divisées, résulte d’actes 
déjà effectués ou sur le point de l’être, la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, 
statuant conformément à l’art. 41 de son Statut, ou le tribunal arbitral, indiquera, dans le 
plus bref délai possible, quelles mesures provisoires doivent être prises. Les parties en 
litige seront tenues de s’y conformer. 
2.  Si une Commission de conciliation se trouve saisie du différend, elle pourra 
recommander aux parties les mesures provisoires qu’elle estimera utiles. 
3.  Les parties s’engagent à s’abstenir de toute mesure susceptible d’avoir une 
répercussion préjudiciable à l’exécution de la décision judiciaire ou arbitrale ou aux 
arrangements proposés par la Commission de conciliation, et, en général, à ne procéder à 
aucun acte, de quelque nature qu’il soit, susceptible d’aggraver ou d’étendre le différend. 
 
 
Article 38 
Les adhésions au présent Acte général pourront s’appliquer: 
A. Soit à l’ensemble de l’Acte (chap. I, II, III et IV); 
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B. Soit seulement aux dispositions relatives à la conciliation et au règlement judiciaire 
(chap. I et II), ainsi qu’aux dispositions générales concernant ces procédures (chap. IV); 
C. Soit seulement aux dispositions relatives à la conciliation (chap. I), ainsi qu’aux 
dispositions générales concernant cette procédure (chap. IV). 
Les Parties contractantes ne pourront se prévaloir des adhésions d’autres Parties que 
dans la mesure où elles—mêmes auront souscrit aux mêmes engagements. 
Article 39 
1.  Indépendamment de la faculté mentionnée à l’article précédent, une Partie pourra, en. 
adhérant au présent Acte général, subordonner son acceptation aux réserves 
limitativement énumérées dans le paragraphe suivant. Ces réserves devront être 
indiquées au moment de l’adhésion. 
2.  Ces réserves pourront être formulées de manière à exclure des procédures décrites par 
le présent Acte: 
a) Les différends nés de faits antérieurs, soit à l’adhésion de la Partie qui formule la 
réserve, soit à l’adhésion d’une autre Partie avec laquelle la première viendrait à avoir un 
différend; 
b) Les différends portant sur des questions que le droit international laisse à la 
compétence exclusive des Etats; 
c) Les différends portant sur des affaires déterminées, ou des matières spéciales 
nettement définies, telles que le statut territorial, ou rentrant dans des catégories bien 
précisées. 
3.  Si une des parties en litige a formulé une réserve, les autres parties pourront se 
prévaloir vis—à—vis d’elle de la même réserve. 
4.  Pour les Parties ayant adhéré aux dispositions du présent Acte relatives au règlement 
judiciaire ou au règlement arbitral, les réserves qu’elles auraient formulées seront, sauf 
mention expresse, comprises comme ne s’étendant pas à la procédure de conciliation. 
Adhesions: 
 
Turquie: (26 juin 1934) 
    Sous les réserves suivantes :  
Seront exclus des procédures décrites dans l'Acte général :  
a) Les différends nés au sujet de faits ou de situations antérieurs à la présente 
adhésion;  
b)  Les différends portant sur les questions que le droit international laisse à la 
compétence exclusive des États;  
c) Les différends nés au sujet de faits ou de situations antérieurs à la présente 
adhésion.  
Grèce: (14 septembre 1931)  
Sous les réserves suivantes :  
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Sont exclus des procédures décrites par l'Acte général, sans en excepter celle de 
conciliation visée à son chapitre I :  
a) Les différends nés de faits antérieurs, soit à l'adhésion de la Grèce, soit à 
l'adhésion d'une autre Partie avec laquelle la Grèce viendrait à avoir un différend;  
b)      b) Les différends portant sur des questions que le droit international laisse à la 
compétence exclusive des Etats et, notamment, les différends ayant trait au statut 
territorial de la Grèce, y compris ceux relatifs à ses droits de souveraineté sur ses 
ports et ses voies de communication. 
 
Source: Turkish Official Gazette, 10 May 1934 
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APPENDIX O 
 
BERN AGREEMENT BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE  
(11 November 1976)  
 
 1. The two parties agree that negotiations shall be frank, throughgoing 
and pursued in good faith, with a view to reaching an agreement based on their mutual 
consent with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf as between themselves.  
 2. The two parties agree that these negotiations shall by their very nature 
be strictly confidential.  
 3. The two parties reserve their respective positions with regard to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf.  
 4. The two parties undertake not in any circumstances to make use of the 
provisions of this document, or such proposals as may be made by either side during 
these negotiations, outside the context of the negotiations themselves.  
 5. The two parties agree that there shall be no statements or leaks to the 
press on the contents of the negotiations, unless they decide otherwise by common 
accord.  
 6. The two parties undertake to refrain from any initiative or act 
concerning the Aegean Continental Shelf that might trouble the negotiations.  
 7. The two parties each undertake, so far as their bilateral relations are 
concerned to refrain from any initiative or act likely to throw discredit on the other.  
 8. The two parties have agreed to study the practice of States and the 
international rules on the subject, with a view to eliciting such principles and practical 
criteria as might be of use in the case of the delimitation of the continental shelf between 
the two countries.  
 9. To that end, a mixed commission will be set up to be composed of 
national representatives.  
 10. The two parties agree to adopt a gradual rhythm in the negotiating 
process to be followed, after mutual consultation.  
Done in Berne, in two copies, in the French language, 11 November 1976  
 
Jean TZOUNIS,  Ali Suat BĐLGE,  
Head of the Hellenic delegation  Head of the Turkish delegation  
 
 
Source: Kılıç, Hulusi. Bilateral Agreements, Essential Documents and Declarations 
between Turkey and Greece since the Proclamation of the Turkish Republic Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, (Ankara: Deputy Directorate General for 
Maritime and Aviation Affairs, 2000) 
